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INTRODUCTION
The Gulf War was the first war in history in which the public
came to expect regular daily reporting from an "enemy capital"
under fire." This inevitably focused attention on the notion of jour-
nalism as a profession. It increased the challenge to a journalist's
professional self-awareness and also tested the professional princi-
ples on which foreign journalists in Baghdad would base their work
as they reported back to countries that were Iraq's "enemies."
Would those principles be the same as principles followed by
the journalists in peacetime and at home? Should they be? Or do
the exigencies of war somehow justify for journalists some sort of
"situation ethics"? How can the professional journalist and the au-
dience distinguish between principled journalism, even when it
comes from an enemy capital, and propaganda? Do "journalists"
even have the right, or the competence, to draw such distinc-
tions-between principled journalism and propaganda-in wartime
when human lives are necessarily at risk? There is a perennial
temptation to abuse the techniques of principled journalism in or-
der to gain better ratings without really deserving them-without
really having added perspective or understanding, but merely ap-
pearing to be doing an impressive job. Is this a temptation that is
more dangerous during war? Can it somehow be guarded against?
Can journalism, for that matter, even be considered a profes-
sion-in any sense definite enough to hold someone's "journalism"
professionally accountable?
Like other international professions such as law and medicine,
During the three-month-long Falklands War (April 2-June 26, 1982) the British audi-
ence came to expect regular daily TV reports from the "enemy capital," Buenos Aires, but,
unlike Baghdad, it was not under fire. Other military actions on foreign soil since the advent
of instantaneous electronic television news coverage have been too short to call a "war" (for
example the U.S. invasion of Grenada, though even there the press was kept away from
most of the action) or not directly threatening to large numbers of home troops (for example
the U.S.-supported insurgence against Nicaragua's Sandanista government, or the retreating
U.S.-supported regimes in Iran during Khomeini's Islamic revolution.) Edward R. Murrow's
radio reports from London during the Blitz were, of course, not from an enemy capital. As
nationals from a neutral country, American reporters were allowed to cover World War II
from Berlin until 1941. ROBERT W. DESMOND, TIDES OF WAR, WORLD NEWS REPORTING 1931-
1945 121 (1984). Several Americans (most notably Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York
Times) reported from Hanoi during the Vietnam War; although of great impact, these re-
ports were of short duration. PHILIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASuALTY 416 (1975).
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the international profession of journalism generates among its
members and its clients a constantly evolving debate about profes-
sional principles and ideals. Judgements, legal or otherwise, made
about the professional actions of journalists may need to be in-
formed about journalism's current professional principles and ide-
als. This article explores some of those principles and ideals, both
as they were engaged in the act of reporting to America from
Baghdad during the second half of The Gulf War, and in general.
I. THE JOURNALISTIC SITUATION, IN BAGHDAD AND IN GENERAL
When the Gulf War started, a number of large news organiza-
tions in America and around the world tried to provide their own
coverage from Baghdad. Approximately thirty-five news companies
succeeded. The rest pieced together reports as best they could us-
ing video, audio, and written news "copy" generated by employees
of those news companies that did get in. In other words, whether
they liked it or not, Americans had little choice: they and the
world were going to be offered daily news coverage from Baghdad
during this war. Why?
In the fifteen years since the end of the Vietnam War, global
communications technology had advanced to the point that instan-
taneous "global village"2 coverage of any major crisis on the planet
2 The advent of "global village communications" was the culmination of a 200-year-
long technological growth. It can be considered the third technological revolution in the
history of human communications. The first was the invention of writing, the second the
invention of the printing press. The third technological revolution-the electronic global
communications net-can be said to have been finally "born" in 1978. Like the two techno-
logical revolutions before it, the electronic global communications net promised to change
the means of international diplomacy, the methods of fighting and resolving wars, and the
reach and rhythms of mass communications. See generally Jonathan Rowe, All Splendid on
TV Gulf War Front, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14, 1991, at 15 (characterizing Gulf War
as television war). In 1978, portable videotape-editing machines were generally available
everywhere. Prior to that, most TV journalists sent unedited film to distant editors. This
practice was the rough equivalent of what it would be like if a print reporter had to transmit
a string of disjointed words or phrases back home to the editor who would then have to join
them together as seemed best. The capturing of electricity 200 years ago might be said to be
the "conception" of this third technological revolution in the history of human communica-
tions, the development of telegraph, photography, movies, sound recording, radio, and tele-
vision, its "fetal growth"; and the advent of spaceflight, communications satellites and un-
dersea fiber-optics, and international direct-dial telephones, its "labor pains." Single words
for "writing" and "printing" seem not to have been established immediately upon their re-
spective inventions, and it seems still too early to know what single word we might use for
this third revolution, which gives us the capacity for "eyes-and-ears-for-everybody-any-
* where-at-anytime"-too long a name to stick, but not unlike some of the first clumsy Ger-
man constructions attempting to label what we now call simply "printing." One can play
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was possible and even taken for granted by many populations. In
the quarter century since the advent of geostationary communica-
tions satellites, many countries on the planet had been sharing
with each other their news video and its attendant verbal "voice-
over" copy on a daily basis. Because the video and its natural
sound need no translation, and voice-over words can be rendered
useful with a quick and inexpensive simultaneous translation, the
TV news "spot" was far more widespread and much more intercul-
tural from the very beginning of "satellite communications" than
was generally realized. Yet a number of Americans chafed at the
notion of American reporters sending daily news coverage from
Baghdad during the war.3 Some, perhaps, remembered only that in
the Vietnam War-the last sizable "war" America had fought-the
only American "journalists" in the enemy country, North Vietnam,
were, with very few exceptions, occasional independents or anti-
administration extremists. The notion of American reporters in
Baghdad may have seemed especially wrong for such Americans,
particularly if they were also among those for whom the Gulf War
finally provided a welcome opportunity to redress the unfair Amer-
ican vilification of American soldiers returning from the Vietnam
War. But, in general, Americans objecting to reporting from Bagh-
dad seemed to believe it could somehow be harmful to American
military efforts and that such reporting could be used by Saddam
Hussein for anti-American ends.
The notion that television coverage, and any kind of mass me-
dia coverage, can somehow have great effect on public opinion in
wartime, or anytime, is of course not new. For many, it seems to be
a truism. In World War I, the generals on both sides of the Battle
of the Somme went to great pains to block from all populations,
for some three or four weeks, the written news reports of that bat-
with words like "globenet" or simply "net," but there's no way to outguess the linguistic and
probably planetary impulse that eventually label this new reality in some handy way. See
Richard Zoglin, The Global Village, Thni, Jan. 28, 1991, at 69 (world is limited globally
through satellites and electronic networks).
3During an interview for ABC's 20/20, Barbara Walters asked General Norman
Schwartzkopf how he felt about journalists reporting from Baghdad during the Gulf War
and whether it was "helpful" to have American journalists in Baghdad. General
Schwartzkopf responded that some of the reports, by emphasizing civilian casualties, per-
haps implied intentional targeting of civilians by Coalition forces. This, he said, generated
resentment in the headquarter's staff and "still bothers [him] a great deal." 20/20:
America's Hero; Your Tax Dollars at Work (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 15, 1991),
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Script file.
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tle's ludicrously immense carnage. Some modern commentators be-
lieve that this news might have drastically altered the course of
that battle, if not of the war itself. The international journalist and
commentator, Alistair Cooke, has suggested that if there had been
modern television news coverage-of the kind we became accus-
tomed to during the Vietnam War-at the Battle of the Somme,
then World War I might have quickly become insupportable.4
Some argued that a similar suppression of the news of war's
horrors would have been virtually impossible in 1991, claiming that
the "global village" effect was simply too pervasive. With more
than a hundred nations generating war coverage in one way or an-
other, and virtually every nation wanting to broadcast it, it was
argued that news that somehow got out anywhere would soon be
broadcast all over the world-even (as we did observe) within
tightly controlled countries like Iraq where people listened
throughout the Gulf War on their transistor radios to Arabic lan-
guage broadcasts from the Voice of America, the BBC, and other
pro-Coalition stations. But the international coverage of this war
demonstrated that, however inevitable the end of the suppression
of news of the horrors of war might be, such a triumph of global
perspicacity is yet to come, at least in any comprehensive form.
Suppressing news from the Iraqi side during the war would
apparently have been easier than from the Coalition side, had Sad-
dam Hussein so chosen. He apparently had the political power to
block most, if not all, outgoing news, but for some reason he did
not want to. Saddam, like the Coalition leaders,5 chose to allow a
limited kind of coverage. Like the controllers of Coalition-side cov-
' See ALISTAIR COOKE, THE AMERICANS 47 (1979). Cooke asks: Had the British popula-
tion viewed the opening night of the battle, would they "have simply shaken their heads and
gone off to the railroad stations to wave their boys off on the troop trains?" Id.; cf. MARTIN
MIDDLEBROOK, THE FIRST DAY ON THE SOMME 253 (1972) (first day of battle, July 1, 1916,
can be described as "the most tragic day in the war" for Britain). British casualties were
approximately 62,000 on the first day; about one half of the men of the 143 attacking battal-
ions had become casualties. Id. Press revelations in Britain were credited with ending the
ineptly handled Gallipoli campaign in World War I. See KNIGHTLEY, supra note 1, at 100-06.
' The American military leadership's long-planned-for success in blocking much of the
news of war's horrors that might have been reported from the Allied side has been discussed
elsewhere and was not directly experienced by this correspondent because I was reporting
from Baghdad. For an explanation of the long planning that led to this media control, see
WILLIAM M. HAMMOND, PUBLIC AFFAIRS: THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA 1962-68 (1988).
Among the few reports which did reveal horrors of the Gulf War are the Pulitzer-Prize-
winning articles of Patrick J. Sloyan, whose address, Press Restrictions During the Gulf
War: "Hail Fredonia," appears in this issue, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 649 (1992), and John R.
MacArthur's book, SECOND FRONT: CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE GULF WAR (1992).
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erage, Saddam and his media advisors allowed little or no depic-
tion of casualties among military combatants. Journalists on both
sides failed, with rare exception, to circumvent this imposed re-
striction. As a result, very little of the Gulf War's carnage and
human suffering was seen from either side.
Given that we now know there was great human suffering in
this war, it might be said that (to use an appropriately ironic mili-
tary metaphor) the Gulf War was, therefore, American broadcast
journalism's "Vietnam. ' 6
Once again, as at the Battle of the Somme, the national lead-
ers, on both sides, blocked public contact with those aspects of the
military action that might awaken public emotions such as horror,
revulsion, and human sympathy. An exception, however, occurred
when it involved the death or suffering of their own civilians or
civilians of allies-specifically, the Baghdad victims of the Amariya
Shelter bombing, and the Israeli victims of SCUD missile attacks.
However, media advisors on both sides seemed to know they
were playing a public relations game that was drastically different
from the one played by leaders in previous wars. The White House
seemed to believe that this had to be a short war, that the global
public's tolerance for the violence' of war, at least when prosecuted
by the world's most powerful nations, was probably much shorter
than it had ever been in the past. Washington's careful and force-
ful response to the many civilian deaths in the Amariya Shelter
bombing, as discussed below, was one sign of this concern.7 Sad-
dam seemed to have a similar belief about a newly shortened
global tolerance for war; it may have been one reason he was able
to publicly count every day his forces held out against the Coali-
tion to be a day of "victory."
But why might the public tolerance for the violence of war
have been shorter than in the past? I suspect that it was shorter,
for at least two reasons. The first was the implications, evident to
humans everywhere, of the new global communications net, the ex-
I This opinion, though little tolerated among American broadcast journalists in the
emotions of the immediate post-war period, has begun to be somewhat more common eigh-
teen months later. Even so "mainstream" a publication as The New Yorker commented on
the institutional passivity in American journalism. The Talk of the Town, THE NEW
YORKER, Aug. 24, 1992, at 24. "The press is shocked not to find itself invited along. Eventu-
ally, the Pentagon softens slightly, and reporters are escorted by military officials to observe
carefully selected portions of the battle area." Id. See generally MACARTHUR, supra note 5
(reporting failure of American journalists to report on human suffering of the Gulf War).
7 See infra pt. II.B.1.
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istence of which seems to imply that we can all communicate now
and should thus be able to avoid the misunderstandings that seem
to lead to war. The second was the implications of the concomitant
emergence of a new international profession that might be termed
"objectivistic" journalism-a journalism which professes to strive
for ever greater perspective and ever improving objectivity and
would thus portray war more realistically and so make war less
palatable. The implications of both are surely that reason could
prevail. Whether or not this suspicion is correct, it is vital for any
discussion of the principles of modern professional journalism that
it recognize not only that "the profession of journalism" has taken
on this "objectivistic" challenge, but that it has done so only re-
cently-within the past sixty years.
The decades that saw the arrival of the new "global village"
communications also saw the parallel development of a new profes-
sion of communications-modern professional journalism.8 This
new and international profession generally values objectivity and
perspective as ideals while recognizing that total or perfect objec-
tivity or perspective is never possible.
The clearest metaphor for depicting this objectivism is per-
haps that in the classical story of "the blind men at the elephant":
a good journalist expands on the picture of the world that the au-
dience previously held; thus, all journalists are like blind men at an
elephant, no one bringing back the same description of what the
elephant (or the world) is. One blind man may say an elephant is
like a snake; another, like a spear; another, like a banana leaf-or a
tree trunk, or a boulder, or a big brush; but the elephant is real,
and that is why a wide variety of news sources, of "blind men," is
healthiest for any society, local or global.
The parallel developments of "global village" communications
and of objectivistic journalism were paralleled also by develop-
ments in the philosophy of science that explain how this new sys-
tem of objectivistic professional goals for journalism might
work-how the genuine expansion of perspective, which does occur
through good journalism, is able to occur.
' Such development of practical ideals often accompanies any technological advances
that increase options. See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
THE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 215 (1965).
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A. Journalism-A Young Profession
In his seminal study, Discovering the News: a Social History
of American Newspapers,9 Michael Schudson discovered that it
was not until the 1930's that either the public or journalists them-
selves expected journalists to pursue an ideal of objectivity. Up un-
til the 1930's, it had been assumed, by journalists and readers
alike, that journalists were advocates and propagandists, paid to
promote the interests of the various private parties who owned the
newspapers.
B. Objectivistic Journalism Does Not Require the First
Amendment
These newly developing ideals of objectivity in American jour-
nalism may, to a certain degree, have been inspired by the United
States Constitution's First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press;' 0 but it is important to note that these
ideals of objectivism do not require a legislated freedom of
speech, however much they may welcome it. Some of the greatest
acts of journalistic profession have occurred in countries with the
most oppressive governments. Harvard's Professor of International
Law, Roger Fisher, has a memorably inverse remark about all this.
He is fond of saying to journalists that "The First Amendment al-
lows you journalists to make fools of yourselves, but it doesn't re-
quire you to make fools of yourselves."
The point is that our modern vocation does not gain legiti-
macy as a profession from the First Amendment, however thank-
ful we journalists are for that amendment. In fact, if a journalist is
leaning a great deal on First Amendment rights, it can be a sign of
weakness in that journalist's professionalism: a professional as-
sumes the right of free speech and does not wait to be given it. He
or she may well fight explicitly for the right of free speech on occa-
sion, but all acts of journalistic profession are an assertion of that
right and an implicit declaration of it.
I believe that a journalist can only gain legitimacy as a profes-
sional through acts of profession. A journalist's acts of profession
9 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AIERICAN NEWSPA-
PERS 161 (1978). Schudson's book grew out of a Harvard doctoral dissertation that "con-
cerned the history of the ideal of objectivity in American Law and in American journalism."
Id. at ix.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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are a kind of promise to the public. The constant fulfillment of
that promise maintains or increases the journalist's professional le-
gitimacy. In journalistic language we call this professional legiti-
macy "credibility." Credibility is all any journalist can ever offer
an audience, and credibility is as close to a guarantee of truthful-
ness as anyone, journalist or recipient of journalism, can ever get.
Truthfulness is all that an objectivistic journalist can hope to
achieve-the attitude of genuinely trying to work toward more ob-
jectivity and more perspective for the audience. Absolute truth and
total perspective are understood to be impossible for any one per-
son or group of people.
C. A Definition of "Profession" as an Existential Promise
The meaning of "profession" and notions such as professional-
ism, degree of professionalism, and professional, are much debated.
Why? I suspect it is because the most common definitions of pro-
fessionalism are inadequate, and sometimes even obscure true pro-
fession, so we feel a general unease about the notion.
True profession, surely, cannot finally be determined by
whether a person has a diploma or a license of some kind, nor by
whether a person accepts money for doing a certain thing. These
criteria may be hints that a person might be a true professional,
but they can also be used as covers for a lack of true profession.
The word "profession" stems from the Latin professio, mean-
ing declaration," and, at its core, any true profession is indeed a
declaration, a definite statement-a kind of promise to try out the
usefulness of what it has risked stating definitely. A true profes-
sional promises the public that he or she will be there, day after
day, trying to do a certain thing-heal bodies, or wrangle through
law courts, or fly planes successfully. To put it in more existen-
tially sensitive terms, a professional says, in effect, you can count
on me, in the midst of the whirl and confusions of your own life
and of the world, to be here, whenever you might need, trying to
do this one specific sort of thing. A professional journalist says, in
effect, I promise that I will be here every day (or every deadline)
trying to make some descriptive sense out of things, to report, to
clarify, to add perspective, and to be interesting. 2
"' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1811 (1981).
2 See generally JOHN HOHENBERG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST 394 (1960) (future of
professional journalism turned toward concept of reporting as public service).
[Vol. 66:563
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This definition of journalistic profession generally matches
Michael Schudson's definition of the modern objectivity-seeking
journalism-which he shows did not exist for the mass media in
America until the 1930's. This definition of journalistic profession
also generally matches what the modern philosophy of science has
shown to be the activity of successful scientists.
D. Journalism and the Philosophy of Science: "Just The Facts"
Inductivism Discredited by the "Hypothetico-Deductive"
Insight
There is an old conundrum still circulating in journalism
schools and news rooms: is it the journalist's job to give the audi-
ence what they want to hear about, or to give them what the jour-
nalist thinks they ought to hear about? The answer, surely, is
neither. It is rather the journalist's job to try, at each deadline, to
give the people in the audience what they did not know they
would want to learn until they learned it. That may sound awk-
ward, but there is no other way to say it. To give them what they
think they want to hear is, by definition, not really news, and to
give them what you think they ought to hear about is, by defini-
tion, propaganda, at least of a personal, intellectual kind.
Of course, what they think they want to hear about, and what
you think they ought to hear about, may be helpful hints for the
journalist looking for real news, but they are never more than
hints. There is never an absolute guarantee that what you present
at the next deadline will, in fact, be something the audience then
agrees that they did not know they would want to know, but are
glad now that they do, or at least be something they then agree
they needed to learn.
This definition of the journalist's task is not as problematic as
it may at first seem. Many journalists are driven, or believe they
are driven, by a desire to give the audience what the audience
ought to know. Yet the journalist still needs to win the audience's
agreement with each report that something about which the audi-
ence needed to learn was indeed conveyed. And many news stories
tend to "assign themselves" because of an obviously common no-
tion of, for example, safety. If an invading army is rolling down the
highway from Alaska to take over the lower forty-eight states, it is
a good bet that most viewers will, upon seeing a report of it, agree
that it was indeed something they did not know that they needed
to learn, but now that they have, agree that they needed to learn
1992]
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it.
There is also a natural inclination in humans to want to hear
what they think they generally know about as opposed to what is
genuinely new and therefore representative of change. All signifi-
cant change is frightening because change brings the unknown;
humans, and all successful animal species, have naturally evolved
cautionary responses to and a healthy fear of the unknown. Signifi-
cant "news" always involves significant change, so even "good
news" has a potential to frighten, at least at first, simply because it
is about something previously unknown.
Alongside the healthy fear of the unknown, of course, all living
creatures have also evolved the equally vital instinct of curios-
ity-the desire for "news," whether it be news of a new food source
in the forest, a new immigration of competitors, or a new energy
source in outer space. However, not only the audience, but the edi-
tors and the correspondents themselves, can never fully escape the
desire to confirm calming presuppositions about the world.
Especially when thinking about journalism in war, it is impor-
tant to note that, ironically, for people who have suffered repeated
oppression, the most psychologically calming news may sometimes
be news that the world is still as violent or evil as they have either
experienced it being in the past or developed the take-no-chances
habit of presuming it to be.
But however great the natural inclination to want the security
of knowing what the news is, there is, by definition of the word
"news," no way of knowing what is news until it has been reported.
"News," in this sense, happens nowhere except in the minds of its
audience.
Sometimes people are fooled, or fool themselves, into thinking
that they have learned news when they have in fact been given
only confirmations of what they previously believed to be reality.
Such confirmations may, of course, sometimes be not only accu-
rate, but reasonably comprehensive, and, in such cases, the news is
that nothing has changed, which by itself can sometimes be impor-
tant information-be "news." But even when it is important to
know that previous perceptions may still serve, there is a danger
that this knowledge may mask other important news about how
things have changed, or divert the audience from additional per-
spectives that show how things have all along been also" different
from what the audience and journalists had thought.
Journalism works at the frontiers of perception (and therefore,
[Vol. 66:563
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in a sense, at the frontiers of legality) or it is not journalism; it
cannot be done in a paint-by-numbers fashion. The mere act of
"keeping stories fresh"-that constant and proper editorial re-
quirement which simultaneously keeps journalism worthy and con-
sumers interested-necessarily involves pushing at accepted cate-
gory lines and reexamining theories, even single words, that had
been used to fix realities the day before.
How do journalists actually keep stories fresh? How do they
actually find out things that are genuinely new, and interesting,
and true, and worthwhile? Not, as it turns out, in the way many of
them apparently think they do-by "just reporting the facts."
Many journalists who have thought they worked that way have
been, nonetheless, excellent journalists; it is just that they did not
quite realize how they did what they did-as the modern philoso-
phers of science can explain. These philosophers have found that
many fine scientists had made the same "just the facts" mistake
'when trying to explain how they did what they did.
The common questions here, for scientists and journalists
alike, and even for artists, are: How do you go about discovering
something genuinely new (and therefore interesting and publisha-
ble or ratings-worthy)? and: How can you tell when you have dis-
covered something genuinely new?
Both scientists and journalists, it seems, have made the same
mistakes in answering these questions because both have believed
in what philosophers of science call "the inductivist fallacy"-the
belief that you learn something new by "just gathering the facts,"
and that you tell you have learned something new by determining
whether you had "just gathered the facts."' 3
E. Sir Karl Popper's Importance for Both Science and
Journalism
In the autumn of 1919, in Vienna, Karl Popper began to grap-
ple with a question that would lead him to make a vital contribu-
tion to the modern philosophy of science.1" Karl Popper asked
" This is one mistake of which artists, for all their foibles, have usually not been as
guilty as scientists and journalists. Artists have generally been readier to acknowledge that
the facts they gather for their form of truth-telling are not absolutes of nature untainted by
the searcher's limited view; artists, certainly including the greatest, have more publicly ac-
knowledged the subjective and intuitive aspect of their fact gathering.
1, As in philosophy and science, so in journalism: it is often the asking of the right new
question that leads to what we later realize to have been a real "journalistic" breakthrough.
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"'When should a theory be ranked as genuinely scientific?' or, 'Is
there a criterion by which we can measure the scientific useful-
ness or quality or status of a new theory?' "15
This query led Popper to what he called his "Demarcation
Theory".16 Popper used this theory to demarcate the boundary be-
tween scientific theories of real value and those that, after all, were
of little real use-which were not very "interesting," to use a word
common to both scientists and journalists. Such a demarcation
theory for journalism could suggest which stories have real journal-
istic value or usefulness, and which do not.
Popper pointed out that scientists were using fallacious, circu-
lar reasoning whenever they claimed that a theory was necessarily
right because the method used to reach it was "correct" ("I just
gathered the facts")." Scientists do at times discover new princi-
ples about the physical universe, principles which presumably were
true even before they were discovered, but for scientists to claim
the principles are true because of how they arrived at them can
make no real sense; if that were so, then finding new truths about
the universe would be a rather mechanical process-just keep cor-
rectly "gathering just the facts." The anecdotal history of science,
however, provides abundant evidence that scientific discovery has
not been a mechanical affair. Instead, it has been full of astonish-
ing stories from scientists about "little voices in the head" and ac-
cidental spills, strange dreams, and quirky suggestions from igno-
rant people in the street, each leading to some critical
breakthrough and successful new theory.
But when asked formally to explain their discoveries, scien-
" Karl R. Popper, Philosophy of Science: A Personal Account, in BRITISH PHILOSOPHY
IN THE MID CENTURY 155 (C.A. Mace ed., 1957). A clear and comprehensive short explana-
tion of Popper's breakthrough is his own autobiographical account. Id. at 154-91.
11 See PAUL LEVINSON, IN PURSUIT OF TRUTH 24-26 (1982) (delineating elements of Pop-
per's demarcation theory); KARL R. POPPER, POPPER SELECTIONS 118-30 (David Miller ed.,
1985) (recognizing demarcation theory); KARL R. POPPER, REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE
174-75 (1983) (testability and refutability should be used as criteria of demarcation to dis-
tinguish between empirical science and pure mathematics); ANTHONY O'HEAR, KARL R. Pop-
PER 96-112 (1980) (discussing Popper's theory). See generally T.E. BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF POPPER 37-82 (1983) (discussing philosophy of science in general); POPPER, supra note 8,
at 33-36 (1965) (indicating problems in philosophy of science); KARL R. POPPER, UNENDED
QUEST 41-44 (acknowledging problem of segregating science from pseudo-science).
17 Popper was not the only philosopher to make this and other observations reported
here. But he was the first to fully systematize this "hypothetico-deductive" view of how
science works-which is not a prescription, necessarily, for how scientists ought consciously
to go about doing their science.
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tists, Popper observed, were likely to claim that they worked "in-
ductively," that they started by gathering the "facts", which they
then assembled into patterns, then axioms, and finally, by a sort of.
pyramid construction, arrived at a crowning single theory that ex-
plained all the "facts" below it and, quite probably, many other
facts like them.
Popper found many problems with this explanation. Not only
was it suspiciously circular, it did not explain how it was decided
what a "fact" was. And just. how did such a fact actually lead to a
theory? The really useful discoveries and theories not only seemed
to be in no way implied by any previously known facts, but they
usually produced, and relied on, new, previously unknown "facts."
The more he examined all this, the more Popper came to appreci-
ate how amazing it is that scientists actually come up with new
ideas and new theories about the universe and, even more amazing,
that some of these ideas actually prove to be good ideas-to be
right!
Popper, leaving aside the question of how scientists come up
with ideas that are not only new but right, worked to define how
we might tell which new theories are more likely to be right (or
useful or interesting) and how we might distinguish them from
those that are not. In general, his demarcation theory established
the following:
1. Confirmation of a theory does not help determine a theory's
rightness, unless it is a special, "high risk" kind of confirmation.
2. New good theories do not disprove or replace old ones, but
rather absorb them, expand upon them, and explain even more
about the universe than was known before; they increase our per-
spective on the universe. Einstein's findings did not displace or
disprove many of Newton's, nor Newton's many of Ptolemy's.
Rather, each generally improved on those preceding.
3. New good theories were stated in terms so definite that it
could easily be imagined how one might refute them-each was
clearly "refutable."
4. A new theory would retain high scientific status so long as it
was clearly refutable and yet remained unrefuted in spite of re-
peated serious attempts to do so.
5. A new theory gained high scientific status if it also pre-
dicted events or observations that scientists would otherwise not
expect. For example, Einstein predicted that light from a distant
star would be attracted by the gravity of large bodies such as the
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sun. Scientists did not expect this, but when a solar eclipse allowed
them to observe that the light of a distant star was displaced
against the background stars. exactly as Einstein had predicted,
scientists believed his new theory might well be true, or at least
"truer" than Newton's had been. This same experiment would also
have refuted Einstein's theory, or at least tended to refute it, had
the light not curved around the sun. In any event, it cannot be said
that Einstein's theory was definitely confirmed in this way, because
scientists cannot be absolutely certain that the displacement of the
starlight, however unexpected, was not caused by some other still
unknown force.
6. Accordingly, Popper recognized that science never deals in
absolute proof or absolute truth. (These are concepts that belong,
in any absolute sense, only to mathematics and formal logic).
Rather, science is a sometimes loose, collective enterprise, which,
at its best, improves on what we knew before; it increases our per-
spective about the physical world, or, at least, improves the appar-
ent usefulness of our growing, or at least changing, knowledge
about it.
7. Essential to all the above is the recognition that there is no
such thing as "the simple facts." A person cannot focus on a "fact"
without first making or accepting assumptions-at least uncon-
sciously. Popper calls these assumptions "observation hypotheses."
An astronomer has to make or accept various assumptions about
telescopes before beginning to consider the "facts" they turn up.
There must be also hypotheses determining which "facts" are
likely to seem important or relevant. Assumptions, or "observation
hypotheses," always have to be made or accepted about where one
"fact" leaves off and another begins. The apparent fact that the
human brain may be predisposed to discern various sorts of phe-
nomena as discrete "facts" would not lessen the point: those would
be the brain's own "observation hypotheses."' 8
In summary, a scientific theory can be said to have high scien-
tific status if it is "high risk" both in the sense of being refutable
and in the sense that it predicts what previously was not expected.
Expected confirmations do not mean much nor show anything new
about the universe. New science improves on the perspective given
to us by old science, and all science is dependent on observation
hypotheses of some kind.
"8 See supra note 16.
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Popper called this expos6 and replacement of the fallacy of
inductivism the "hypothetico-deductive" view of science. New hy-
potheses are somehow reached; they are then granted status after
passing tests to determine not only if they are refutable (a journal-
ist might say "stated in good clear definite language") but also if
they produce some surprising deductions, such as that a star's light
will bend around the sun.
Or, in journalistic terms, for example, that a close journalistic
examination of certain phone records would reveal disturbing de-
ceptions in the White House, as happened in the Watergate scan-
dal. The point is that journalism is no less a hypothetico-deduc-
tive enterprise than is science, and that it can be dishonest for
journalists not to admit it. Interestingly, a major hypothesis that
the Watergate journalism seemed to prove-that Richard Nixon
should leave office-is no less susceptible to being improved upon
(and even partly disproved) than was Newton's hypothesis of a lin-
ear and exact universe-a hypothesis that seemed unshakable for
two centuries, until Einstein.
All the above discoveries about the hypothetico-deductive na-
ture of science are no less revealing for modern, objectivity-pursu-
ing journalists than they are for scientists. A good journalist always
makes sure, somehow, that both he and his audience can tell what
his observation biases are. Good journalism has no hidden agendas.
In fact, good journalism can be generally described as the bringing
into the open of hidden agendas of various kinds-both in the
world and in the journalist.
In contrast, propaganda can be partly defined as a kind of
pseudo-journalism that keeps its advocacy-its observation bi-
ases-hidden. 19 The importance of "body counts" was taken for
granted by journalists in the early years of the Vietnam War, but it
eventually proved to be an "observation hypothesis" that itself de-
served critical attention: the number of dead in Vietnam was not
' There is a sense in which the best new journalism and the best new science produce
not only new theories or stories out of the old ones, but new observation biases as well. This
can help explain Thomas Khun's notion of "paradigm shift." See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (2d ed. 1970). It can also help describe why
good journalists experience what might be called "the third week effect" when covering
wars-along about the third week in a war you begin to realize that many of the basic
presumptions with which you came into the war, even pertaining to who the combatants are,
are woefully inadequate; reality starts working in your mind to enlighten it. Richard Wil-
bur's poem Mind (which I first came across pinned to a bulletin board in a university sci-
ence building) speaks directly to this common aspect of science, journalism, and art:
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leading to much new (much less accurate or honest) insight or per-
spective, as some journalists at first thought it might.
One way of defining sloppy or second rate journalism is to say
that it is journalism that is careless about choosing and using its
observation biases and disregards the necessity of making them
clear. The best journalistic work produces "high risk" reports that
are refutable and that predict (at least in the story assignment pro-
cess), then produce, findings that people otherwise would not have
expected. (This is a way of describing partly what journalists mean
by "a good story.")
But Popper's demarcation guidelines for telling a good scien-
tific theory (or piece of journalism) from a useless one still leave
unanswered the question of how you actually go about producing
such theories (or reports). Karl Popper realized that you can not
first decide to have a certain good idea and then have it. Einstein
did not plan to discover his theory of general relativity the next
afternoon and then do so.
How do you go about having not only new ideas but good ones,
ideas (or news reports) that would expand our knowledge and un-
derstanding of the world? Some might at first consider this a frivo-
lous question for a journalist, arguing that it is enough, once you
have had ideas, to be able to differentiate the good ones from the
bad. This argument is palpable nonsense; every good professional
journalist (or scientist or artist) has his or her own running rumi-
nation on how to do the job well, not merely how to tell when he or
she has done it well. There is every reason to believe that without
these ruminations good journalism (or science or art) would not
happen. Journalism is a consciously willed and at least partly di-
MIND
Mind in its purest play is like some bat
That beats about in caverns all alone,
Contriving by a kind of senseless wit
Not to conclude against a wall of stone.
It has no need to falter or explore;
Darkly it knows what obstacles are there,
And so may weave and flitter, dip and soar
In perfect courses through the blackest air.
And has this simile a like perfection?
The mind is like a bat. Precisely. Save
That in the very happiest intellection.
A graceful error may correct the cave.
RICHARD WILBUR, NEW AND COLLECTED POEMs 240 (1988).
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rected craft. It does not happen automatically.20 In fact, conversa-
tions of one kind or another about the theory and principles with
which we work are constant and common among journalists, not
spurred only by crisis such as wars. Such conscious thoughts about
our craft are part of what make it possible for us to see "journalis-
tically" at all.
But in the end, Karl Popper seems not to have concerned him-
self much with the question of just how good new ideas arise. Sir
Peter Brian Medawar, however-a medical researcher in Britain
who studied the philosophy of science after winning the Nobel
Prize for his work in immunology-followed the ramifications of
the mysterious sources of good ideas and in doing so he provided
an answer for those scientists, and journalists, who, accepting Pop-
per's insights, might then be asking: "Well, if I didn't get my good
ideas by induction, by just reporting the facts and pulling them
together, then how did I get those good ideas?"
F. Sir Peter Brian Medawar's Importance for Both Science and
Journalism
In April, 1968, at the University of Pennsylvania, Sir Peter
Brian Medawar delivered a series of lectures on the philosophy of
science. He concluded by making the following observation about
how ideas that are both new and good are formulated:
That "creativity" is beyond analysis is a romantic illusion we
must now outgrow. It cannot be learned perhaps, but it can cer-
tainly be encouraged and abetted. We can put ourselves in the
way of having ideas, by reading and discussion and by acquiring
the habit of reflection, guided by the familiar principle that we
are not likely to find answers to questions not yet formulated in
the mind....
... The scientific method is a potentiation of common sense,
exercised with a specially firm determination not to persist in er-
ror if any exertion of hand or mind can deliver us from it. Like
other exploratory processes, it can be resolved into a dialogue be-
tween fact and fancy, the actual and the possible; between what
could be true and what is in fact the case. The purpose of scien-
20 See PAUL J. LEBRoY, MICHELANGELO'S MODELS 12 (1971). One notable example is
Michelangelo, whose voluminous letters to his family reveal a constant exploration of his
craft and creativity. Id. Such continuous examinations of craft and art are no less common
among successful teachers, doctors, lawyers, architects and other professionals.
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tific enquiry is not to compile an inventory of factual information,
nor to build up a totalitarian world picture of natural Laws in
which every event that is not compulsory is forbidden. We should
think of it rather as a logically articulated structure of justifiable
beliefs about nature. It begins as a story about a Possible
World-a story which we invent and criticize and modify as we go
along, so that it ends by being, as nearly as we can make it, a
story about real life."
Professional journalists may find it exciting that the very last
words with which this eminent scientist and philosopher of science
ends his summation of the scientific endeavor are words with such
a journalistic ring-"a story about real life." There are other
phrases in these Medawar paragraphs which will also sound famil-
iar to the professional journalist: "a specially firm determination
not to persist in error" and "a dialogue ... between what could be
true and what is in fact the case."
It has perhaps been less recognized by journalists about their
craft, than by Medawar about his, that all we can ever do is begin
with "a story about a Possible World-a story which we invent and
criticize and modify as we go along" but that is the case. We are all
blind men at the elephant, and none of us is perfectly articulate.
Medawar's major contribution to the debate was the recogni-
tion of the reality and studiability of "intuition"-which, in the
above passage, he also calls "creativity"-and the realization that
there are certain proven ways in which we can "put ourselves in
the way of having ideas."
Where Medawar says a scientist might read, discuss, or form
questions, or acquire "the habit of reflection," so. might a journalist
who is looking for good ideas. Journalists, in fact, have a wide
range of habits with which they get themselves "in the way of hav-
ing" good journalistic ideas. One of them is simply to go some-
where where the journalist feels or thinks there is likely to be a
good "story" and get busy trying to focus attention on it.22 If it is
real news, you can not be sure what it is until you get there, but
your professionally developed and nurtured intuition may guide
you.
21 PETER B. MEDAWAR, INDUCTION AND INTUITION IN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 57-59 (1968).
22 Medawar's words about "reading, discussing.. ." and so forth might help explain to
non-journalists why one of the three words that the American Society of Professional Jour-
nalists has chosen to put on its coveted journalism award (alongside the words "talent" and
"truth") is "energy."
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Medawar finally makes accessible (for scientists and journal-
ists alike) the apparently frightening "intuition" that Popper's hy-
pothetico-deductive view of science seemed to posit (though Pop-
per could not bring himself to talk much about), and which good
journalists have always known, somehow, was one of their most vi-
tal professional qualities-"a good journalistic gut." (Again, as the
bracketed additions will indicate, for every instance of the words
scientist, science, etc., one might read the words journalist, journal-
ism, etc.):
The major defect of the hypothetico-deductive scheme, con-
sidered as a formula of scientific behavior, is its disavowal of any
competence to speak about the generative act in scientific en-
quiry, "having an idea," for this represents the imaginative or log-
ically unscripted episode in scientific thinking, the part that lies
outside logic. The objection is all the more grave because an im-
aginative or inspirational process enters into all scientific or jour-
nalistic reasoning at every level: it is not confined to "great" dis-
coveries, as the more simple-minded inductivists have supposed.
Scientists are usually too proud or too shy to speak about
creativity and "creative imagination"; they feel it to be incompat-
ible with their conception of themselves as "men of facts" and
rigorous inductive judgments. The role of creativity has always
been acknowledged by inventors, because inventors are often sim-
ple unpretentious people who do not give themselves airs, whose
education has not been dignified by courses on scientific method.
Inventors speak unaffectedly about brain waves and inspirations:
and what, after all, is a mechanical invention [or a journalistic
report] if not a solid hypothesis, the literal embodiment of a be-
lief or opinion of which mechanical working [or editorial account-
ability and audience interest] is the test?
Intuition takes many different forms in science and mathe-
matics [and journalism], though all forms of it have certain
properties in common: the suddenness of their origin, the whole-
ness of the conception they embody, and the absence of conscious
premeditation. The four examples I shall give are not meant to be
exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
(a) Deductive intuition: perceiving logical implications in-
stantly; seeing at once what follows from holding certain
views .... [Perceiving at once, for example, that if the American
government had wanted to help Ayatollah Khomeini into power
to replace the ailing Shah, then it might well have organized an
orderly scheduled retreat of American interests from Tehran in
the months leading up to Khomeini's arrival there-something
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which journalists could check into.]
(b) The form of intuition which, unless we are to abandon
the word altogether, might as well be called inductive: thinking
up or hitting on a hypothesis from which whatever we may wish
to explain will follow logically. This is the generative act in scien-
tific discovery, the invention of a fragment of a possible
world .... [Such as (again to use Watergate) the hypothesis that
the Watergate burglaries and related irregularities all stemmed
from a pattern of conscious deception in the White House.]
(c) The instant apprehension of analogy, i.e.[,] a real or ap-
parent structural similarity between two or more schemes of
ideas, regardless of what the ideas are about. . . . [The observa-
tion that the managerial methods with which the Thatcher gov-
ernment kept journalists from covering the action of the Falk-
lands War were similar in some ways to the methods with which
the U.S. restricted coverage on the Saudi side of The Gulf War.
Or, the journalistic observation that suburban students some-
times do poorly in school for the same reason that their counter-
parts in inner cities do-parental neglect. Or, the observation
that audiences sometimes give closer attention to well-reported
foreign disasters than to routinely reported domestic ones for the
same reason that they pay more attention to seat-belt safety TV
ads using wooden dummies than they do to such TV ads showing
real bodies-foreign places and wooden dummies are less threat-
ening to identify with.]
(d) ... For an experimentalist the most exciting and pleasing
act in science is thinking up or thinking out an experiment which
provides a really searching test of a hypothesis. We recognize the
intuitive element in such a process when we speak of experimen-
tal flair or insight .... [-Such as an assignment editor might use
when thinking up a really good way to cover a breaking story
about which people are already beginning to form all sorts of un-
founded opinions.]23
All these forms of intuition, and others, occur constantly in
the thought processes of journalistic activity. For a journalist to
disavow this and claim rather that his thoughts are somehow the
consciously produced result of some sort of strict and controlled
logic would be ridiculous. Experienced journalists know that, if
they do their job well, they will necessarily find even their most
basic beliefs about a story susceptible to change. It is not uncom-
mon for a correspondent to go into a major story with one set of
23 MEDAWAR, supra note 21, at 55-57 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 66:563
REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD
beliefs about what the story is, and even who the major players
are, and find three weeks or three months later that his evolving
insights present him with a very different understanding of the ele-
ments of the story.
But none of the above directly addresses the question, often
depicted as a thorny problem, of the role of "entertainment" in
journalism.
G. The Fallacy of "The Entertainment Problem" in Journalism
It is often argued, erroneously, that journalism fails in its pro-
fessional duty when it somehow gives in to the "temptation" to be
entertaining, as if entertainment were somehow a frivolous or anti-
objective or anti-thoughtful phenomenon. Sometimes there seems
to be a pro-dullness bias in such comments, as if any "serious" or
genuinely "responsible" news product would necessarily have to be
dull, and conversely that the more "entertaining" or even "inter-
esting" it is, the less serious it must be. Most disappointing is the
tendency of professional journalists to use the fallacy that serious
news is not entertaining as an excuse for their own failure. It does
indeed require very hard work to produce something that the audi-
ence "didn't know they would want to learn until they learned it,"
something that is entertaining in the way news must be in order to
be news. In a journalist, an elitist attitude (at least about literacy)
or a complacent one fosters the belief that if the audience did not
get it, it is the fault of the audience. But this is antithetical to our
profession, which promises to be there every deadline trying to
clarify issues and actions in such a way that the audience members
will feel, once they have heard the news, that it is worthwhile (and
therefore not boring). Good journalism has to entertain-and do so
according to strict non-fiction rules.
There are several reasons for the mistaken view that serious
news and entertainment are somehow mutually exclusive. For one,
there is often a confusion between the notions of entertainment
and fiction, as if only fiction, which is an anti-journalistic method,
can be entertaining. The fallacy that the news must not be enter-
taining may also result partly from the coincidental terminological
categorization of large media companies, at least in the typical
American network bureaucracy, into "the entertainment division"
and "the news division"-a division that implies that the notions
of news and of entertainment are mutually exclusive. This bureau-
cratic division is in fact understood by most professionals to be one
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between "fiction" and "non-fiction" programming. This explains
one of the reasons there is some confusion in the media industry
about how to classify the new spate of "infotainment" and "re-cre-
ation" programs which frighten some professional journalists
(though not always this author) as being a dangerously misleading
sort of pseudo-news.
Entertainment and news are never mutually exclusive. All
communication seeks, and needs, to be entertaining; if news were
not entertaining, it could never communicate. Communication re-
quires the holding of attention; this is what entertainment, in a
basic sense, does. The word stems from the Middle English enter-
tinen meaning "to maintain," from the Old French entretenir
meaning "to hold between," and from the latin inter meaning "be-
tween" and tenere meaning "to hold." '24
News has always attempted to entertain the mind, and more
specifically, to entertain that expectation of becoming well in-
formed with which the reader or viewer agreed to give some time
and attention. Mathematicians seek to entertain other mathemati-
cians. Presidential advisors seek to write memos which do not bore
their president but rather entertain the president's need to be well
informed. This usually means writing something shorter and
punchier (and thus more entertaining) than a castled scholar
might, just as it means the same thing for someone who would of-
fer journalism to a mass media audience.
As mentioned previously, journalism is always looking for a
new way to see things, not only because such "freshness" in a story
will win and retain readers, listeners, or viewers and thus get better
circulation or ratings, but also because it is what the public and
the journalists want and like. The human mind enjoys the experi-
ence of being enlightened, and "enjoys" it in a neurological sense
(so to speak) even when it is frightening or sad news. Once aroused
in the mind, the drive to become enlightened can be powerful, and
sometimes ineluctable, though there is no absolutely certain way of
knowing beforehand when or how enlightenment will happen. The
quality and nature of that enjoyment or entertainment reveals the
quality and nature of the journalism. In the print medium, both
The New York Times and The National Enquirer entertain their
readers, but in different ways.
The way in which the television medium entertains the mind
24 WEBSTER'S, supra note 11, at 757.
[Vol. 66:563
REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD
is frightening to some leaders and some elites. They seem to fear
its ability to sway public opinion irresponsibly. Television is in-
deed no less capable of relaying irresponsible communication than
is print, and it has at least one enormous advantage over print:
television is an "a-literate" medium; it does not usually require
that you be literate before it can entertain your mind.
The advent of global television has meant, for example, that
people who are wise but do not know how to read, or do not read
at advanced levels, may now acquire more information which they
can use when dealing with people who are not wise but do read at
advanced levels. The general quality and nature of, say, a good
New York Times report may, if the television journalists do their
work, be available in a good TV report to people who do not read
at advanced levels.
There has been a tendency among many of the highly literate
people in government, academia, and print journalism to have a
sort of pro-literacy bias against most television journalism-the
same sort of bias they may have against people who do not read at
advanced levels. These biases help perpetuate, and are fed by,
some of the most common fallacies about the television medium,
and about the necessary economics of the medium, which are com-
mon in literate conversation. For example, the myth that the tele-
vision medium shortens the attention span; that it appeals to emo-
tions over reason; that it suffers from a debilitating need to say
things short and that saying things short or with short sound bites
is necessarily an inferior form of communication; or the myth that
television is basically a visual medium, and that when the words
and the pictures -in a TV news spot contradict each other the
viewer will necessarily take in the pictures and disregard the
words. There has never been research to prove any of these points,
though academics and others sometimes claim there has been. It
may be that advancing these claims assuages pro-literacy anxieties
about the frightening power of some television reporting. There is
voluminous testimony to be obtained from many television news
professionals to explain why these common beliefs are wrong.
The flaws evident in television news-and they are many-are
in the way it is being done, not in the intrinsic nature of the me-
dium or any necessary economics of the medium. TV news is in its
infancy-barely fifty years old. Working in TV news now is some-
what like being a painter in early Renaissance Italy: TV's many
"city states" around the world are each creating their own styles of
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news and then comparing and competing with each other, just as
leading Renaissance painters and their patrons did.
When executed with expertise and enlightenment, TV news
can be no less responsibly consequential than anything in
print-though in somewhat different ways.
H. TV News "Spotcraft"-What the Human Head Does:
Combine
The TV news spot is the first artifact in human history that
reproduces what the human head does: it performs the same com-
bining function. A TV news spot is constructed of three parallel
"ribbons of time": sequential video shots, sequential natural sound
usually related to what the video shows, and the correspondent's
"voice-over" words on the narration track. Sometimes the corre-
spondent will go "on camera" for a sentence or two in the course of
the news spot, during which time these three parallel ribbons of
time achieve a potentially powerful identity: the video, the natural
sound, and the correspondent's words briefly become one in the
evident person of the correspondent.
This combinative nature of the TV news spot reproduces the
activities of the human head when, for instance, its body walks it
into a situation to be an "eyewitness" to something. The eyes give
the head sequential video as the eyes dart around from point to
point; the ears give the head natural sound which is usually related
to what the eyes are looking at during that moment; simultane-
ously, into the head come verbal ideas about what is being seen
and heard, and about what might be seen and heard next. Into the
head also will come suddenly awakened memories which somehow
relate to what is being witnessed. These are like the bits of histori-
cal "file footage" sometimes inserted into a TV news spot. The
mind may also be spurred to imagine things that might be some-
how related, somewhat like the imaginative use of graphics some-
times incorporated into a TV news spot.25
By what logic does the mind select where to search with the
eyes? It may have something to do with the words and other
thoughts that have, in the meantime, come into the mind. This
intricate interaction is paralleled in the writing and videotape-edit-
ing process. For example, good TV news spotcrafters take great
5 Richard Wilbur and other poets seem to have something similar in mind when they
speak of a good poem as being "a model of experience." See supra note 19.
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care to have each new video shot in a sequence come in at just the
right moment before or after the correspondent's words have said
something.26 In other words, it is neither powerful video nor pow-
erful writing that makes a great TV news spot. It is the powerful
combination of video with words-the setting up of a back-and-
forth continuous mutual revelation between the words and the
video. It is the very same back-and-forth that somehow affects ac-
tion in a human eyewitness-the action of searching some specific
next place with the eyes and the action of the legs next carrying
the head to some specific next place for more eyewitnessing.
Sometimes, of course, a piece of video emerges that needs no
words to be journalistically interesting, but not often. The vast ma-
jority of TV news pieces that rivet people's attention do not con-
tain video that would be particularly noticeable on its own. The
video in these pieces is simply part of a carefully interwoven arti-
fact also involving words and natural sound. When they play well
off of each other, they may together tell an interesting or even
compelling story of some kind.
What keeps the eyes darting around? Not only fear. There are
obviously many different motives feeding the natural appetite for
news.
L The Evolution of "Taste"-in Movies and in News
Movie critic Pauline Kael provided a vital insight into this as-
pect of "news" in a February 1969 Harpers magazine article enti-
26 This intricate interaction between the "internal" verbal thoughts and the perceived
"external" non-verbal sights and sounds-the logic or patterns by which the conscious and
unconscious mind somehow decides where next to search with the eyes (and where next to
search with the internal verbal capacity) may be a complicated relation, or more compre-
hensive extension, of the linguistic "deep structure" for human language which Professor
Noam Chomsky believes is inborn. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LAN-
GUAGE 67 (1975) (discussing "deep structures"). If so, it would be a sort of deep structure for
action itself, not just language, or at least a deep structure for the actions of perception
since it seems to determine not only where next to move the eyes, but sometimes the entire
body.
21 One might say that the visual element dominates in the TV news spot only in
whatever way it dominates in the human head's combinative mix when the head is "eyewit-
nessing." There is indeed an intellectual tradition stretching back centuries that claims
sight to be "the king of the senses," but this assertion is always much in dispute. Blind
people may be consulted, including Helen Keller who was also deaf.
The current belief that TV news is mostly about the pictures is probably inevitable
enough. The pictures, the video elements, are the latest things to have been added into the
artifacts available to journalists, so they get the most attention, being the newest.
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tled "Trash, Art, and the Movies. ' 28 Posing the question, "Does
trash corrupt?" she answered, no; it just eventually bores us, after
giving us what little it has to show us, and leaves us wanting some-
thing better.29
When you're young the odds are very good that you'll find some-
thing to enjoy in almost any movie. But as you grow more exper-
ienced, the odds change. . . . Unless you're feeble-minded, the
odds get worse and worse. We don't go on reading the same kind
of manufactured novels-pulp westerns or thrillers, say-all our
lives, and we don't want to go on looking at movies about cute
heists by comically assorted gangs. The problem with a popular
art form is that those who want something more are in a hopeless
minority compared with the millions who are always seeing it for
the first time, or for the reassurance and gratification of seeing
the conventions fulfilled again. Probably a large part of the older
audience gives up movies for this reason-simply that they've
seen it before.
[T]he big change is in our habits. If we make any kind of decent,
useful life for ourselves we have less need to run from it to those
diminishing pleasures of the movies. When we go to the movies
we want something good, something sustained .... 30
Kael concludes: "If we've grown up at the movies we know that
good work is continuous not with the academic, respectable tradi-
tion but with the glimpses of something good in trash, but we want
the subversive gesture carried to the domain of discovery. Trash
has given us an appetite for art."31
"The domain of discovery" is also where the news audience
wants to be carried, and "the subversive gesture" is a phrase that
any experienced, honest professional journalist will recognize as
describing something essential to our craft. Professional journalists
are not necessarily iconoclasts, exactly, but they are necessarily
skeptics-people who are always exploring, questioning, and exam-
ining. That is the service with which we promise to try to entertain
the minds and hopes of our audience.
There is surely a parallel to be seen in the following four
progressions: the progression (described by Pauline Kael) in a
28 Pauline Kael, Trash, Art, and the Movies, HARPERS, Feb. 1969, at 65.
29 Id. at 83.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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book-reader's or moviegoer's life of looking for ever more interest-
ing books and movies; the progression (described by Popper and
Medawar) among scientists of looking for ever more perspective-
giving and useful theories about the world and the universe; the
progression (described by Michael Schudson) in the history of
American newspapers when they finally, in the 1930's, advanced
beyond yellow journalism and began to appeal to their audience by
promising an objectivistic approach, even though no laws required
it; and the progression (commonly experienced by most all working
journalists) in the efforts of the journalist who is trying to keep
every next report about the story he is working on fresh and
interesting.32
Moviegoers, scientists, newspaper readers, and journalists
themselves like to have their perspective improved. They all have a
deep urge wanting this to happen. Somewhere in her writings Pau-
line Kael has said that "genuine entertainment is nothing for
which anybody ever needs to apologize; in fact, it is very hard to
achieve. ' 33
Objectivity can provide perspective and thus entertain and
please the mind. As the example of all four above progressions sug-
gests, objectivity is the child of freedom, not of laws requiring ob-
jectivity. Scientists do not discover good new theories because
someone has ordered them to do so. American newspapers did not
develop the ideal of objectivity because any law required it.
Moviegoers do not want better and better movies because someone
else decided for them what such movies would be. And successful
correspondents in the field do not keep their stories truly fresh be-
cause editors back at home base told them what to write.
Objectivity in an individual is the child of freedom in that in-
dividual, and objectivity in an institution is the child of freedom in
that institution. Individual journalists in oppressive societies who
have made courageous individual acts of free expression must have
had something in their upbringing or character that gave them
32 Skeptics about the ratings-value of such efforts may study the ratings success of the
"American Agenda" series on the ABC News show World News Tonight With Peter Jen-
nings. The series set out to provide in-depth coverage not only of national problems but also
of apparent solutions being tried around the country--"good news" stories. The audience
responded by boosting the ratings over other news shows which retained a much more heav-
ily crisis-oriented mix of news stories. John Carmody, The T.V. Column, WASH. PosT, Aug.
27, 1992, at C4 (ABC leads network news ratings). The audience obviously found the in-
creased perspective of apparent solutions, given the problems, to be very interesting.
3' Kael, supra note 28, at 83.
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deep, radical freedom of perception and expression.34 In America,
the institution of the press was given the freedom to become objec-
tive by the First Amendment.
Is it possible for genuinely entertaining news-news springing
from attempts at objectivity and expanded perspective-to be
evil? (For example, what about Hitler's propagandistic Nazi jour-
nalism?) This question goes to the heart of this article and its an-
swer explains why there can be such a thing as "principled journal-
ism" while reporting from an enemy capital under fire. To reach
the answer, however, we must first perceive the difference between
principled journalism and propaganda.
Clearly, various media-spoken, written, printed, and elec-
tronically broadcast-may be used to help corrupt individuals and
groups. Many studies show that gratuitous violence on television
and in the movies increases the likelihood of viewers, both young
and old, becoming more mindlessly violent people. Goebbels' work
in post-Weimar Germany helped forge an evil policy of discrimina-
tion and racism. And surely Pauline Kael, if asked, would say that
when she concluded that "trash" does not corrupt us, she did not
mean by trash any propagandistic works that set out specifically to
incite violence or discrimination, but rather just immature or sim-
plistic mindlessly commercialistic entertainment.
Over time, of course, there is no problem-given enough mem-
ory. When a group of people discover themselves to have accepted
a line of thought which diminished life and led to evil, then they
may want to avoid such thought in the future. 5 Over time, evil, by
definition, is something people want to avoid, along with anything
that might lead them into it. Who wants pain, disgrace, suffering,
exclusion, truncated options, loss of freedom, and diminished life?
The question for us here may be whether it is possible to identify
that sort of journalism which is most likely to lead to such evil,
and conversely, which is most likely to lead away from it.
" Recent examples include journalist Pius Njawe, who, despite censorship, jailings, and
threats of violence has published an independent newspaper in the west-African one party
state of Cameroon, Richard Carver & Dan Swanson, Africa's Press of Freedom: The Messa-
ger, THE NATION, Feb. 17, 1992, at 192, Chinese dissident journalist Liu Binyan, Anthony
Lewis, Abroad at Home; People or Monsters, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1990, at A27, and Ro-
berto Eisenmann, a Nicaraguan newspaper publisher who exposed Manuel Noriega's corrup-
tion while advocating democratic reforms, The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: To Catch a Spy;
Policy in Panama; Junk in Food? (EBC and Gweta television broadcast, June 20, 1986).
11 See, e.g., Tyler Marshall, Germany Marks the Site Where Holocaust Began, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al (building monument will hopefully avoid future genocide).
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I believe it is possible to identify such journalism, and that the
answer lies in recognizing true skepticism. The word "skeptic"
does not, as we sometimes think, imply in any way anything cyni-
cal or negative or pessimistic. The word stems from the Greek
skeptesthai meaning to examine or consider.3 6 Professional jour-
nalists are professional skeptics. Professional propagandists are
not.
Professional journalists keep questioning, questioning not only
the objects of their reporting but the methods which they use; they
keep examining in public their very observation hypotheses and
the presumptions by which they are acting. Propagandists do none
of these things, though they may pretend to. Professional journal-
ists keep bringing into the open even their own agendas. Propagan-
dists keep trying to hide them, and thus to coerce unauthentic ac-
tion from the people who are the objects of the propaganda.
Propagandists must necessarily try to keep some information in
the dark, but not true journalists. It is the journalist's job to
change his mind as often and as well as he honestly can. It is prop-
agandists' to resist a change of mind.
At the core of this dilemma lies the question of whether
greater perspective decreases the likelihood of evil? I believe that,
by definition, it does, and that humans are more likely, by however
slim a margin, to promote good when they are better informed
about the realities of the world-about "the elephant." This is not,
I think, a declaration of faith in human nature. It is, rather, an
observation about what is naturally universal in human concepts of
evil and suffering, as will be further explained below.
It may well be that a population which harbors evil prejudices
wants to see more and more reporting that tends to confirm those
prejudices, but such reporting is not true journalism. In the lan-
guage explained above, such reporting would not "give them what
they did not know they would want to learn until they learned it"
because it would not really give them anything they did not al-
ready know. It could fool some into thinking it was news, and help
them perpetuate a sort of self-propaganda; but it would be bad
journalism-not professional and not true.
Suppose a mass audience and its mass media journalists agree
on an evil observation hypothesis-such as the hypothesis that suf-
fering is acceptable for some people and not to be thought of as
'" WFBSTER'S, supra note 11, at 2132.
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evil. Some Nazis, for example, seem to have had such thoughts re-
garding Jews. Journalists who then keep reporting news about
what is happening to Jews under Nazi conditions but do so with-
out constantly questioning this (evil) observation hypothesis are,
like any journalists ignoring observation hypotheses, not being
truly professional. The constant and somehow open or accessible
reexamination of observation hypotheses is one prerequisite of
honest journalism and, for that matter, of any honest
communication.
J. Stories and Megastories: Social Evolution Through News
Coverage
The manner in which entertainment of the mind and the dis-
couragement of evil are brought together in any good journalism
can be seen perhaps more clearly when examining how every re-
port or "story" is also a report about one or more "megastories."
Why do mass audiences watch foreign news stories on TV that
have no direct effect on their lives? Or watch any news spots that
do not? The easy answer, of course, is that such stories are inter-
esting. But why are they interesting?
Every single story or report must have at least one megastory
of which it is a part, otherwise the audience could not possibly be
interested in it, or entertained by it. In 1980, American audiences
watched for a week as TV news reports from southern Italy showed
how local inhabitants were suffering, and coping, after a bad earth-
quake. The earthquake clearly would have little impact on life in
the United States. But the audiences seemed interested in the
megastories being covered in each report-what is it like in an
earthquake, how might humans handle suffering, how might relief
efforts be organized, how do family groups respond when their
home social base (in this case a whole village) is wiped out?
Megastories evolve, but more slowly than individual stories.
For example, the plane crash megastory (What is a plane crash
like?) has clearly evolved. A comparison of the coverage of individ-
ual plane crashes in 1960 with coverage of plane crashes today
would reveal that journalists and audiences now find different
things about them interesting. Much more is now known about
plane crashes than was known in 1960. For example, questions
about the fate of the "black box" are likely to run much higher in
reports now, as are questions about drug testing of the crew and
depictions of methods used to help people escape. Similar compari-
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sons can be made of the way politics, or war, was covered in 1960's
as opposed to the 1990's.
War is, in the post-Vietnam era, a relatively fast-developing
megastory in America (What is it like? What causes it?). Early in
the Vietnam War it was assumed that body-counts were necessa-
rily interesting. That changed, as did any presumptions about nec-
essary American superiority. During the Gulf War, it was assumed
that Nintendo-like military video of precision bomb hits was criti-
cally important, but in the two years following that war, journalists
and the public have expanded their view. (This is not to say that
the astonishing accuracy of the new weapons technology of the
Gulf War was not also an important story. It was part of not only
the weapons technology megastory, but also of the very immediate
global-balance-of-power megastory. For example, did not this dis-
play of high-tech hardware intimidate the nearby Soviet mili-
tary?-And is it not possible that the constant display of it by the
American command was meant to?)
There is a natural desire in humans to gain increased perspec-
tive, thereby entertaining their minds. They get this sort of vital
entertainment, one way or another, through megastories, which are
the source of their interest in most individual stories they see,
read, and hear. Reporting on megastories through individual sto-
ries is a highly efficient way to increase perspective on the world
(the individual story can act like a metaphor for the larger megas-
tory) and increased perspective about the world-the true world,
the real elephant-increases, in balance, the likelihood of avoiding
evil. It is the incompleteness of our perspective, including our per-
spective over human suffering, that is our dangerous flaw and the
journalist's constant challenge. -
During the Gulf War, the U.S. military offered news in one
megastory-the advance of military technology-in a way that di-
verted audiences from vital news about at least two other megasto-
ries-the reality and ramifications of human suffering in the con-
flict, and the impact of current American foreign policy on
American popularity among the populations of the Middle East.
The American audience stayed glued to its TV sets watching mili-
tary briefings of military hardware displays ("the Nintendo war")
while almost all of the human suffering in the war went unreported
and unrecorded.
Some would see in this a perennial human tempta-
tion-curiosity over compassion-which is reminiscent of stories
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no less venerable than that of the apple in the Garden of Eden. In
this post-Eden world, however, it seems we have no choice but to
recognize that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and to keep
trying to get more, to keep improving our perspective, lest we fall
unwittingly into more evil.
The megastory about the advance in American military tech-
nology was not unimportant; the problem was that professional
journalists allowed themselves to be diverted by it rather than
spending more energy in trying to get at other parts of the war and
at other important megastories.
K. "The Media" Is Not a Synonym for "The Journalists"
It is critical at this point to distinguish clearly between the
often confused terms "journalism" and "the media"; they are not
synonymous. Media are physical things. Journalism is a profession,
a peculiar stance of the soul and promise to society which an indi-
vidual might choose to adopt and give. Many different professions
use the media. For example, the professions that we currently find
using the medium of television in Manhattan include "the oldest"
(prostitution), political propagandists, poets, singers, math profes-
sors, painters, advertisers, jugglers, and also some journalists, each
with varying styles and degrees of professionalism. To talk of jour-
nalists and "the media" as if they were the same is as silly as it
would have been in 1930 to talk of anyone who used the printed
word and journalists as if they were the same. This critical distinc-
tion between medium and profession is made succinctly in the af-
fectionate quip that I heard recently about my ABC News col-
league, Sam Donaldson, famous for his aggressiveness and energy,
which says that "if television didn't exist, Sam would go door-to-
door."
The only good thing about the fact that people so often say
"the media" when they seem to mean "journalists" may be an un-
conscious inference that anyone who would communicate with the
public has a responsibility to do so honestly and with perspective.
When Edward R. Murrow made his famous remarks about how the
infant medium of television had to be used well if it was not to be
"merely lights and wires in a box, '3 he was making a clear distinc-
tion between medium and profession. It is interesting to note that
his comment does not refer only to the profession of journalism,
37 R. FRANKLIN SMITH, EDWARD R. MURROW: THE WAR YEARS 14 (1978).
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but to any profession which might use television.
L. Professional Journalism Requires You to Give Up the Pleas-
ure of Advocacy
It might be argued that one way to distinguish professions
from each other is by the particular sacrifices each requires. I
would argue, in light of all the above, that the profession of jour-
nalism requires a person to give up the pleasure of advocacy. If
journalism is a constant examination of things, a constant skepti-
cism and a constant bringing into the open of hidden agendas,
then it cannot be advocacy-of anything other than excellent
journalism.
Of course journalism (and all perception) requires the accept-
ance or at least the unconscious use of some kind of observation
biases, otherwise there could be no selection of facts at all. But
even these must be held constantly susceptible to examination.
This is where journalism is most distinctly different from advo-
cacy. Advocacy attempts to promote an end regardless of what
might be discovered on the way to gaining that end. Journalism
may pose a hypothetical end ("for the sake of argument"), but
promises that it will give primacy to whatever is discovered on the
way to that end that might be of interest and give the audience
something they agree they needed to learn once they learn it.
Advocacy may well be more important to the world than jour-
nalism. Advocates are often risk takers and brave forgers of neces-
sary new and better worlds. Be that as it may, the journalist
promises a hopeful service of useful skepticism as he makes a jour-
ney-such as a journey into Baghdad during the Gulf War.
II. REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD DURING THE GULF WAR
A. Before Baghdad: Principles and Ideals-Foreseen
I watched the first four days of the Gulf War from the ABC
TV News control room in New York (my regular assignment being
to cover the education story in America). During this period, I vol-
unteered to help out with the war coverage wherever needed. ABC
News asked me first to go to Israel from where I had previously
reported. On the way to the airport, the assignment desk called to
say there were now enough ABC News reporters in Israel, and
asked if I would go to Amman, Jordan and try to get into Baghdad
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from there. After two weeks in Amman during which we pushed
every contact we could think of in Europe and the Middle East,
and sent various letters into Baghdad with drivers, we finally got
our visas for Baghdad.
During this time in Amman I reviewed the journalistic princi-
ples I would follow, the conditions for maintaining journalistic in-
tegrity I would require in Baghdad, and discussed these with the
news team we were putting together for Baghdad. Such a review is
not a bad thing to do when facing the urgent and potentially
deadly challenges of trying to send perspective-expanding reports
out from amidst the emergencies of a war.
I had at least seven "rules," developed in the course of cover-
ing previous wars, which I reviewed before going into Baghdad:
1. It had to be possible at all times to tell my editors and audi-
ence about any and all restrictions placed on us regarding our
reporting.
2. If restrictions became such that we were unable to get to
what we considered was the significant story of the day, or if we
had any reason to believe restrictions on our movements or report-
ing might significantly warp our news shows' coverage away from
truthfulness, then we would refuse to report at all and, if such con-
ditions persisted, we would pull out-or,, at least, try to.
3. I would refuse, without exception, to report anything that I
had not been completely free as a journalist to decide I wanted to
report. I would take no "directions" of any kind from anyone
about what ought to be said in my reports. The reports had to be
mine-ones I would freely own up to then and later. If any official
began to make such "suggestions" or give such "directions," I
would immediately protest, making my journalistic position clear.
(Throughout my three weeks in Baghdad, none ever did.)
4. I would request, if it was not already provided, military
clearance (not "censorship") from relevant local authorities." I am
not a spy, but a professional journalist-and journalism is an inter-
national profession. To work freely as a journalist in war, I have
found it critical that there be no question in anybody's mind that
my purpose might be secretive in any military sense; therefore, I
need continuing agreement-"clearance"-that I am not dealing in
8 This might surprise some, but it is not uncommon in war. Our Western news teams
in Damascus during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war helped set up such a procedure in order to be
able to get any reporting at all out of Syria.
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sensitive military strategic information. Only thus is it possible to
overcome the apparent paradox of being a professional journalist
reporting from a field of military operations (much less from an
enemy capital).
5. I would not take part in any reporting activity which I
thought might increase the chances that ANY human-in uni-
form or not, on any side or none-would be injured or killed.
6. -With one obvious exception: ourselves. But even regard-
ing our own safety, there must be extensive precautions. Journal-
ists, unlike soldiers, rarely, if ever, fulfill any professional purpose
by getting injured or killed. It would be clear within our team that
any one of us could decide at any time that we should leave or pull
back or go no further; heroics were not wanted, only clear perspec-
tive-adding reporting. Our head office at ABC News in New York
persistently reinforced this view to us, valuing our lives above any
story. While it would not be possible to proceed into Iraq "only if
it were safe," as our head office wished, we were able to tell them
that, given the above understanding of profession, we would pro-
ceed only when there was what we felt "an acceptable professional
journalistic risk"-a measurement that must obviously be deter-
mined by each individual, just as each journalist must, in the end,
offer a personal definition of the word "profession."
7. It would also be important that we never let our journalistic
sense of balance and accuracy be lulled by our faith that our re-
ports from Baghdad would be editorially screened in New York
and then presented with balancing and cautionary context by
anchors and other reporters. Our knowledge that our reports would
work through this due editorial process gave us freedom to explore,
as it does anywhere, anytime, in war or peace; however, our desire
for ever better access, perspective, and freedom of expression must
remain urgent.
In other words, the healthiest professional response to re-
stricted expression, even in war, is not less coverage, but more. At
the same time, it is critical for the professional journalist to remain
constantly vigilant to the possibility of truth-warping imbalance.
On one hand, it is wise to recognize that it is never possible to
report all of the truth; on the other hand, it is irresponsible not to
recognize that, with diligence, it is possible to succeed in not re-
porting anything which is not true. A professional journalist is
someone who knows how, when the deadline arrives, not to report
what he does not know.
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It would, as always, be very important never to give in to the
eternal temptation, sometimes stronger for on-camera broadcast
journalists than for print journalists, to seem to know more than
we did. When we did not know something, it would be critical, es-
pecially under these restricted circumstances, to say, live on the
air, that we simply did not know.
1. Propaganda Versus Professional Journalism in Baghdad
The above conditions and principles would be necessary for
maintaining journalistic integrity and credibility in Baghdad, as in
any war, but they would not have been sufficient. The principles
by which we would select our subjects (within the openly reported
restrictions to which we would be limited) and by which we would
then select our words and edit our shots, would also have to be
consistent with professional principles used anywhere, in war or
peace.
In America's first-ever regular daily reporting from an enemy
capital under fire in wartime, we felt it would be vital to show our
audience that our professional practices and ideals were not some
sort of "situation ethics" which could be altered for emotional con-
venience. After all, what might they then think of our future jour-
nalism, after the war?
It seemed that the perennial battle over journalism's profes-
sional ideals would, in the Gulf War, involve temptations to con-
sider whether professional journalism might, in wartime, allow it-
self somehow to become propaganda. I believed then and believe
now that it must not, and I consider this to be a vigorously patri-
otic belief although some Americans, including journalists, clearly
felt, and still feel, otherwise. The First Amendment does not re-
quire that a professional journalist avoid propaganda, though the
First Amendment's guarantees of free speech are certainly helpful
for such a professional practice-for the avoidance of propa-
ganda-as they are for those who would let themselves become
propagandistic whether in pursuit of ratings or for any other
reason.
The journalism that I profess-and that I believe is largely
professed in post-World War II America-is one which generally
considers objectivity a necessary though never-attainable goal and
one which seeks to add not only information but also perspective
to what was previously known. I also believe professional post-
World War II journalism would claim, at least, that it selects its
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subjects giving priority to crises of human rights, fairness, or jus-
tice whenever it seems urgently necessary to do so. This journalism
presumes that demonstrably unfair, selfish, or pain-inflicting acts
are negative and that the basic wrongness of such acts is beyond
debate, whether they are the acts of individuals, local groups, or
nations.3 1
2. A Bedrock "Observation Bias" Stated by Hallie and Warnock
As discussed previously, honest journalism needs to be open in
some way about its "observation biases," just as scientists must
recognize in some way their "observation hypotheses." The clearest
and most succinct expression I have found of my own (and I be-
lieve the generally accepted) observation bias is in the opening
paragraph of Professor Philip Hallie's article, Skepticism, Narra-
tive, and Holocaust Ethics:
In Contemporary Moral Philosophy G.J. Warnock wrote the fol-
lowing arresting sentences:
... I believe that we all have, and should not let ourselves be
bullied out of, the conviction that at least some questions as to
what is good or bad for people, what is harmful of beneficial, are
not in any serious sense matters of opinion. That it is a bad thing
to be tortured or starved, humiliated or hurt, is not an opinion: it
is a fact. That it is better for people to be loved and attended to
rather than hated or neglected, is again a plain fact, not a matter
of opinion ....
These are strong claims, and important ones, and yet they
have not been discussed much in contemporary ethics. Perhaps
they are too outrageous-or perhaps they are too un-
problematic-to take seriously. Anyway, I think they deserve at-
tention, especially by people who wish to understand ethics in re-
lation to history in general and to the Holocaust in particular."
Accordingly, I felt that whatever we selected, within our re-
strictions, to cover, if we did get into Baghdad, must be selected
with the same healthfully skeptical pursuit of interest and concern
for basic values of human rights (which protect people from being
" Many born since World War II do not realize that such ideals and basic "observation
biases" were not generally assumed by our profession before that war, nor that the constant
struggle for objectivity was not even generally accepted as an ideal for our profession until
the 1930's. See supra pt. I.A.
40 Philip Hallie, Skepticism, Narrative, and Holocaust Ethics, PHIL. F., Fall-Winter
1985, at 1 (quoting G.J. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 60 (1969)).
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"tortured or starved, humiliated or hurt"), fairness, and honesty
that we try to have in selecting stories, images, and words when
covering local stories inside the United States in peacetime. For
example, I felt it would be important to hear what the people in
Baghdad felt, to hear their side of the story. This may sound obvi-
ous now, but the American audience had never before had the ex-
perience during wartime of such reporting on a routine basis from
within the enemy population, reporting about emotional public
opinion, including the possible effects on the "enemy population"
of the enemy's propaganda.
I felt public opinion itself should become more of a story. It
felt wrong to me that our audience should not know and think
more about the complexities of public opinion and its manipula-
tion. It seemed paradoxical to me that we professional journalists
in "the media" should be expected somehow to stay inside self-
limited bounds of some sort of good "propaganda." In fact, the ex-
pectation that we should do that in war might well be seen by
some as a sad commentary on the professionalism of American
broadcast journalism in peacetime: if people do presume in peace-
time that we are, in effect, just propagandists in one way or an-
other, why should they trust us to be honest skeptics in wartime,
when shifts in public opinion might well cost lives?
It is critical at this point to recognize what Professor Hallie
demonstrates about the fact that being a skeptic-someone who
perpetually explores and examines-does not mean having no
strong beliefs, though it does mean being open about them. Profes-
sor Hallie distinguishes between the ancient Greek skeptics and
many modern, post-Descartes skeptics like Bertrand Russel who
rejected
as absolutely false everything he could even imagine to be false;
among these beliefs were the belief that he had a body and that
there was a world around him. He had to reject-temporarily of
course-the veracity of his experience. That is to say, he had to
do something that would be deadly as far as his everyday life was
concerned; if he were to do this sort of thing in the streets he
would in all likelihood be crushed by cartwheels, or if he did it at
the table (what table?) he would in all likelihood starve to
death.41
Professor Hallie admires instead the ancient skeptics, whose
Id. at 33-34.
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beliefs, I feel, come close to stating the observation hypotheses of
many modern professional journalists:
Their kind of doubting was eminently practical. The ancient
skeptics whose ideas we know in detail never doubted experience.
Modern philosophers are so smitten with Descartes that they
have for the most part ignored what we might call the "practical
doubt" of the original Skeptics, the kind of doubting that is brac-
ing to everyday living instead of deadly to it. To put their posi-
tion briefly, the early skeptics would not allow themselves to be
bullied out of believing in experience. What they doubted were
abstractions that could neither be confirmed by experience nor
confuted by it. What they doubted were any beliefs that dis-
tracted them from experience.2
Of course, professional journalists must always hold their own
"observation biases" up to open examination, and bring any hid-
den agendas into the open. But to do that, and to state that one's
observation biases, say, include the biases of G.J. Warnock that
some kinds of evil are beyond debate,43 is to be neither unskeptical
nor unprofessional. It is rather to be open and honest, and there-
fore more useful as a reporter to the people attending to your
reporting.
3. A Desire for Self-Propaganda?
Wartime is famous for its tendency to inflame emotions in
home populations. During a war, people are more likely to assert
positions passionately rather than consider them coolly. Thus, the
spectacle, for the first time in history, of journalists reporting regu-
larly from the enemy capital under fire was upsetting for some
people.
This is one reason it seemed our profession might be severely
tested in Baghdad. There might also be great temptations for some
Americans in our audience to want to administer a curious sort of
self-propaganda, as if they would ask us not to report to them any-
thing that might divert their minds and moods, though it were
true, from whatever they might think the American military and
administration wanted them to feel and think.
Those who did object to even principled reporting from Bagh-
dad, though, seemed always to fear how it might affect other peo-
42 Id. at 33.
"' See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ple's" thinking, not their own-about which they usually seemed
unshakably certain. (There remains, of course, the possibility that
they actually feared having their own opinions changed.) To any
who might object that no matter how principled it was, any re-
porting from Baghdad might still increase the chances of Ameri-
can soldiers getting hurt or killed, my answer was simply that I
would not report whenever I thought there was any such likeli-
hood, as stated above in "rule" number five. And if at any point I
had thought my actions might have increased the chances of any
human getting hurt, I would have stopped.
As it turned out, during my three weeks in Baghdad I never
once felt that conditions required me to stop reporting. This may
surprise non-journalists or those who have not covered many wars,
but I do not think it will surprise many journalists who have cov-
ered wars. There is something about the truly journalistic endeavor
which does not often lead it into situations where the reporting
would lead to injury or death for anybody-other than the journal-
ists.44 But the reasons to report as broadly as possible, given the
restrictions and our professional principles, on realities inside
Baghdad went beyond the issues, emotions, and dangers of this
particular war.
Whenever professional journalists cover any war, we cover not
only the particulars of that war, but also the ever-returning phe-
nomenon of war itself. This is unavoidable, and to try to avoid it,
to try somehow to separate a given war from the general drift of
human history and its long sufferings, would not only be unprofes-
sional, but immoral. Nor would it even be possible. The general
always provides necessary and compelling context for the audi-
ence's interest in the specific, the "megastory" is always vital to
the "story. ' '4 5
Accordingly, I went into Baghdad with a definite sense that
our team must not let itself be swayed, by narrow emotions and
issues, from what was truly "the bigger picture," though many of
the narrower emotions and issues would, of course, need to be cov-
ered to give our audience the fullest possible picture of what was
happening. In fact, it was within the particular details of this war
that we would find more enduring patterns of war itself. Where
11 I suspect this has something to do with a deep disjuncture between activities which
kill and activities which inform openly-but this belief is not necessary to principled
journalism.
15 See supra part I.J.
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else?
In other words, we must never let ourselves feel complacent
about suffering, never allow ourselves to accept, with traditional
wartime complacence, that "these are the sort of things that hap-
pen in war." There was no escaping the fact that the problem of
war itself was the "main" story. If the bedrock "observation hy-
potheses" of modern journalism-the principles on which we select
facts and images from an infinite field of facts-include the princi-
ples that suffering and loss of human rights are to be avoided and
that justice should prevail among people, then to ignore the more
familiar and universal pains of war itself would have been to ig-
nore, as it happens, the very principles for which the Coalition
leaders said-at least some of the time-they were fighting this
war.
We knew, going in, that some in our audience would not be
able to distinguish, at least at first, between principled professional
journalism from Baghdad and "pro-Iraqi reporting" or Iraqi propa-
ganda. Some people might mistakenly presume that any reporting
that showed that the "enemy population" had a variety of complex
and human faces and emotions would work against any good forces
in their own country's battle. But we also felt that as long as all
the above-stated conditions and principles could be met and fol-
lowed, then vigorous, rigorous reporting from Baghdad would be
good, right, and professionally honest. There seemed, in any case,
to be little doubt that it would be genuinely interesting to our au-
dience, and genuinely "interesting" is almost always a sign of good
journalism.
I also knew what experts in the growing field of Conflict Reso-
lution and Analysis46 have determined: in balance, the presence of
vigorous international reporting in international conflicts helps
prevent those conflicts from growing even worse, and increases the
chances that there will be less loss of life, resources, and op-
tions-for all parties and all sides. I do not believe that it is the
job of the professional journalist to stop wars or end famine or save
the ecosystem. However, I do believe that there is nothing unpro-
fessional about believing that if we do our jobs well as professional
journalists-professional skeptics-that it will greatly increase the
chances of those good ends. It must be acknowledged, however,
that this belief is based on a belief in the ultimate goodness, by
,6 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (2d ed. 1991).
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however narrow a margin, of human nature when it is well
informed.
None of the above is any different from the professional prin-
ciples I would pursue in peacetime coverage, but the extreme emo-
tion, dangers, and emergencies of war make it prudent, when possi-
ble, for the professional journalist to project his principles as much
as possible into the imagined particulars of the imminent battle he
or she is about to enter-as we47 did in Amman. For example, cam-
eraman Rupen Vosgimorukian and I, over one very long lunch in
Amman, tried to imagine what we could shoot that would be
worthwhile, given the severe restrictions we expected under the
heavy bombing we had heard was occurring in Baghdad. We con-
cluded that there might be a worthwhile story on every street cor-
ner-if we could only get in.
B. In Baghdad: Test by Action
Two reports we filed from Jordan during our wait there-on
Jordanian attitudes toward Saddam and toward the U.S.-helped
us prepare editorially. Those two spots would help give us a fix on
how to differentiate between general anti-Coalition points of view
of the non-Iraqi Arabs and those of the Iraqi Arabs.
When our visas finally came through at the end of the third
week of this six-week war, we drove in across the much-bombed
Amman-Baghdad desert highway in a scattered convoy of some
twelve vehicles carrying journalists from five continents.
There were five ABC News vehicles, including two small
trucks containing a satellite ground station, generators to power it,
and several barrels of gasoline to fuel the generators. This ground
station would break the CNN monopoly on satellite transmissions
from Baghdad-a monopoly that had blocked all non-CNN trans-
missions from Baghdad which might be seen in North America and
had greatly limited any Baghdad-originated transmissions to the
" I am taking care in this analysis to use the words "I" and "mine" instead of "we" in
certain places for two reasons: the individual journalist's integrity is as close to a guarantee
of truthfulness as journalism can ever get; and just as the approval of each one in our four-
man-team would be a kind of "necessary condition" for getting our reports out, so each one
would know that his safety or professional judgment alone could be a "sufficient condition"
for stopping our production or leaving.
In any case, TV news is most often a team game or it is nothing, and, as what follows
will indicate, it was most visibly so for us in our ABC newsteam in Baghdad. It may also be
that a journalism which reflects teamwork between individuals may have its own special way
of detecting teamwork between nations.
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rest of the world. This fact only stiffened the resolve of ABC tape
editor/engineer Vladimir Lozinski to "refuse to go one step back-
wards" when, at the mid-desert Iraqi border post, Iraqi immigra-
tion officials told us there were complications with our visas and
that we should go back inside the Jordanian border (some miles
back) and wait. All the foreign journalists in our convoy quickly
followed Vladimir's indignant lead; this meant we had to sleep the
next two nights in the desert in our cars during near-freezing win-
ter downpours, but it also meant that we all got into Baghdad
without what threatened to be another week's delay.
We arrived late Sunday afternoon, February 10, 1991. Lozinski
and our satellite dish engineer had our ABC ground station assem-
bled and broadcasting to five continents, for a number of compa-
nies, within two hours.
My first act upon arriving in the lobby of the Al-Rasheed Ho-
tel, which we were told was now the base for representatives of
about thirty-five news companies from around the world, was to
seek out the man who was directly in charge of clearance and pro-
cedure for all foreign correspondents. He told me that there were
three basic ground rules:
1. Reports must not contain "military strategic information"
of any kind-no exact measurements of distances to bomb hits, no
exact location of bomb hits and no reporting about significant
movements of obviously military equipment or personnel. All
scripts and cut spots must be cleared by one of their people before
transmission to assure them that this military restriction was not
being violated.
2. We must never do a live broadcast, nor talk on any of the
satellite telephones, without one of their people present-whose
job, we were told, would be to make sure we did not violate the
above rule about military strategic information.
3. We must never leave the hotel grounds without their per-
mission and without one of their people as an escort.
I told him I could live with these restrictions as long as I
would always be free to tell my editors about them-which I al-
ways was throughout my entire stay. I regularly discussed all such
restrictions on pre-feed phone calls to New York and London, and,
especially during my first few days in Baghdad, I discussed them
on the air with anchors so that our audience would become gener-
ally aware of them. During our very first live on-camera correspon-
dent-to-anchor discussion, on Monday morning, February 11, I was
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even able to coax an Iraqi "listener" to come on camera with me so
we could better demonstrate this process to our audience.
There was a fourth restriction which was not often discussed
between us and the Iraqi officials, though I did discuss it quite
openly on the phone with my editors and on the air with anchors:
the understanding that the Iraqis would not clear any reports that
they felt were somehow directly critical of Saddam Hussein or his
regime.
We were also permitted to discuss freely on the air, live and in
cut spots, the fact that we were never allowed to go to military
targets and thus that we presumed much or all of the heavy bomb-
ing we heard most nights was on such targets-while on a few oc-
casions we were taken to see damaged civilian targets.
It was not true, as some reported, that we were allowed to go
only to places the Iraqis suggested. On many of the days I was
there, our ABC newsteam told the Iraqis where we wanted to go
and they agreed to let us. Our most frequent chosen targets on
,such occasions were the neighborhoods of Baghdad, and we man-
aged to roam with our camera through about a dozen of them dur-
ing the two-and-a-half weeks of bombing before the war ended. We
always had an Iraqi escort with us. He was never in uniform and in
my experience always held himself back, never interfering with our
ad hoc interviews with the people we came across, letting us ask
what we wanted of whom we wanted. I did not, however, presume
that this person's presence might not influence our subjects to
speak less than freely. This had to be a judgment call, and I never
put any ad hoc interview sound bites on the air that I felt were not
genuinely heartfelt and representative of significant attitudes in
the city. It was clear to me that many of the Baghdadis did not
like Saddam Hussein's police state rule. But it was also clear to me
that so long as there was loud, nightly bombing on their city, many
Iraqis felt that at least Saddam was an Iraqi standing defiantly
against what many Iraqis saw as the latest onslaught from an oil-
dependent West in an eighty-year-long war over domination of the
oil fields. We reported all of this, in spots and in live exchanges
with anchors. I had an impression that even anti-Saddam Iraqis
might be experiencing that sense of cohesion under aerial bom-
bardment which has been seen in other wars (such as Vietnam)
and I reported this impression.
We felt that a regular treatment of the human life of the city
was a worthwhile story, and pursued it every day when there was
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not some more urgent breaking story demanding our attention. We
also kept up our requests to meet with high-ranking Iraqi officials.
These were never granted us nor, as far as we knew, granted for
any other journalists either, during the last three weeks of the war.
We also kept probing for permission to get closer to the Iraqi side
of the battle in Kuwait, which was never given.
1. The Amariya Shelter-No Mystery (We Hope)
Without even going to the "front," we and other foreign jour-
nalists in Baghdad provided what turned out to be some of the
only video showing what it was like for people at the receiving end
of what were otherwise presented to Americans as Nintendo-like
bomb runs-the video of the blown roof and civilian casualties at
Baghdad's Amariya air-raid shelter. Surprisingly little such video
exists for a six-week war which was turned by the Allied aerial
bombardment into what professional analysts publicly called "the
most firepower intensive conflict since World War II." By subse-
quent Pentagon estimates, tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers died
in this war. 8
On the morning of February 13, Iraqi press officials in the Al-
Rasheed Hotel informed all foreign journalists that there had been
a disaster with many civilians killed and that we would soon be
taken there, or allowed to go in our own cars with escorts. By mid-
morning we arrived at a scene of turmoil and attempted rescue.
It was immediately obvious to me at the scene that there were
numerous civilian deaths; many of the bodies being brought out
were clearly those of children and women. We interviewed many
different people waiting outside who each told different and de-
tailed stories about how women, children, and old men in their
families had been using the bomb shelter, many since the first
night of the war three and a half weeks earlier. There were also
tarnished plaques over the entrances identifying the building as
the neighborhood civilian air-raid shelter.
It was therefore immediately clear that, whatever the Allies'
reason for hitting the shelter, this was a major "trag-
edy"-regardless of whether it occurred during a war. This was
also precisely the sort of wartime event that people might be
tempted to brush off by saying "this is the sort of thing that hap-
48 What Newspapers Are Saying, UPI, June 19, 1991 (reporting Pentagon estimate
that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died).
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pens in war"-as they frequently have in previous wars.
The bottom line seemed pretty clear right away. General
Thomas Kelley, the Coalition spokesman, said in a briefing that
day that the Coalition "did not know the civilians were in there"
and that if they had known they would not have bombed it.4 In
other words, whatever the Coalition's reasons for hitting it, it was,
technically, a "targeting error." General Schwartzkopf seemed to
reconfirm this two months later in an interview on ABC's 20/20 in
which he said he had resented any implication by reporters that
the Allies had meant to hit any civilians in the shelter.50
It was, apparently, one of "those horrible accidents that hap-
pen in war" which, I felt, was important to report, and to report
with especially demonstrable accuracy. I went back to the shelter
several times over the next three days to keep reassessing various
claims and counterclaims.
Neither the Coalition nor the Iraqis could, or would, prove
conclusively to the public that the Amariya shelter was or was not
also being used as "a command and control center." Some of the
potentially related questions, such as whether there was or was not
camouflage painted on the roof, were in my opinion irrelevant to
the central facts: a large number of civilians had been killed and
the Pentagon had said, in effect, that it was an intelligence error
and that they would not have targeted the building if they had
known about the civilians.
After the Coalition said they would not have hit the shelter if
they had known the civilians were inside, they then repeated their
assertions that the shelter had military markings. On the day after
the bombing, reporters found camouflage patterns painted on the
roof, under the gravel-like coating of decimated concrete which two
bomb explosions had strewn across the entire roof. From the first
day, we observed that there was barbed wire on the fence around
the shelter. None of these observations could confirm for reporters
whether there were military activities in the shelter. Camouflage
painting and fences-even with barbed wire-were a common sight
on many buildings around Baghdad even before the Gulf War
started. Many of these signs of wartime had appeared during the
years of the Iran-Iraq War.
41 Pentagon News Briefing, Feb. 14, 1991, Fed. News Serv., available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Fednew file.
80 20/20, supra note 3 (remarks of General Schwartzkopf).
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On the second day after the bombing, I was able to tour the
lower level of the shelter-knee deep in water from the fire hoses
we had seen being used soon after the bombing. There seemed to
be little room for many people, civilian or military, amid the air
and water filtration equipment and nuclear disaster treatment
rooms we found on this level. If there was military activity in the
shelter, then, as far as I could see, it would not have involved a
great number of people. But this raises another disturbing possibil-
ity, which I did not broach in my reporting. There could conceiva-
bly have been a "Hiroshima dilemma" facing the Coalition that
night. On the second day after the bombing, there were rumors
among some journalists that Saddam Hussein had been seen at
that shelter hours before the bombing and that the Coalition might
have been "Saddam hunting." If this was the case-although I
never heard of any evidence to confirm it-might not the Coalition
have considered the deaths of the civilians in the shelter a justifia-
ble price for killing Saddam and, as some might argue, for bringing
the war to a much earlier close with much less loss of life? If that
was the plan, and Saddam escaped, might not Coalition spokeper-
sons have been instructed to say that they would not have bombed
the shelter if they had known the civilians were in there-even
though they did know? This is speculation only, and so I did not
report it during the emergencies of the war, nor did I find or make
the time, as the war moved into its next stages, to look further into
the matter.
It was clear that Iraq would try to use the Amariya disaster as
propaganda. That did not mean, in my judgment, that I should not
report the disaster in as much detail as possible. For one thing,
accurate detail, in a skeptical context, often defeats propaganda's
efforts. It also seemed quite likely to me that the Pentagon, having
stated their mistake from the beginning, would then continue to
talk tough about the event in order not to send any dangerously
misleading message to the Iraqis or to the world that this meant
they might somehow weaken or let up their general attack. This
was one of the occasions when I relied on the balancing context of
due editorial process back in New York to help present our reports
well. I was able to keep track of that process, to some degree, in
satellite phone conversations with editors once or twice a day and
through live on-air talk with anchors.
Within a day of the Amariya bombing, Pentagon and other
sources floated widely circulated reports that the Al-Rasheed Ho-
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tel, where the foreign journalists were staying, was itself a com-
mand and control center. I responded, as did many other journal-
ists from various countries, by asking for, and receiving, permission
to explore the entire hotel, including its grounds and basement,
freely, unescorted except for a hotel employee who would open any
door and hatch we asked. We found nothing to raise any suspi-
cions. I was thus able to report to my editors and on the air that,
insofar as we, who were not highly trained in military technology,
could tell, there was nothing that might raise suspicion. I felt it
was critical that our war coverage, as any coverage, should never
let itself be subservient to "experts"-that what the common per-
son can see and tell is always relevant and important. I also re-
ported that the hotel basement had been continuously in use from
the beginning of the war as the official shelter for the families of
hotel employees who lived nearby.
When pressed the next day, Pentagon sources told ABC News
that what the Al-Rasheed Hotel contained was a military commu-
nications "cable exchange" that we, as non-experts, would not rec-
ognize. Many of the foreign journalists in the hotel privately dis-
missed as Coalition spin-control (possibly even trying to turn the
American audience against the journalists who had just reported
the Amariya shelter disaster's "targeting error") the Pentagon's
new insistence that the hotel was a military target; they considered
its timing-the day after the Amariya bombing-as suspiciously
coincidental and, having checked it out as far as possible, moved
on to more productive stories.
2. Baghdad's Neighborhoods and Residents During the War
Almost every day, cameraman Rupen Vosgimorukian and I
roamed neighborhoods of Baghdad, sometimes even without a
camera, and developed some sense of what people felt. We felt that
the partial randomness of our discoveries, given that we already
had some familiarity with people's feelings, was an important part
of our reporting. The hospitality shown to us (the cups of coffee,
the talk) was typical of our reception on many days in Baghdad
neighborhoods even though we were from the country that was
leading the bombardments every night. We felt that this hospital-
ity should be reported and shown to our audience, even though we
knew some viewers might think that it was either disingenuous or
exceptional.
"The shield of profession" is a phrase I would come to use
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later to explain, especially to incredulous Americans once I got
back home, why these people, under our bombardment, did not
tear me and my crew limb from limb. It frequently occurred that
angry people would approach us, especially when they saw Rupen's
camera and my notebook, and vent their thoughts, sometimes with
great emotion and cogency, into our camera and notebook. There
were a few times when I wondered for a moment if my only shield,
so to speak, was not the little notebook in my hand and my fast-
scribbling pencil, but time and again these tools of my profession
seemed, by their presence, to defuse any personal animosity. The
people in the neighborhoods of Baghdad seemed to understand our
profession and treated us accordingly.
In some of my TV spots I made a point of dealing with an
aspect of Iraqi "mentality" which, though it is legendary among
travelers including non-Iraqi Arabs, was, I felt, little recognized or
appreciated among American viewers. This was the Iraqis' particu-
lar insistence upon dignity-something different from similar atti-
tudes of dignity in Asian, American, and other Middle Eastern
countries; it lay behind the interpretation many Iraqis gave Sad-
dam's actions after the latest "ultimatum" by George Bush, and
was critical to understanding Iraqi points of view, whatever you
might think of Saddam's actions.
One of our spots included a teenage girl saying the war was all
about "greed, .greed for oil." This was important, I felt, to help
convey the sad reality that humans in all countries continually fall
into the dangerous logical fallacy of what philosophers call "single-
cause thinking," even though philosophers of all major cultures
have been warning us for centuries that single-cause-thinking is
not only dangerous, but evil. (Hitler, for example, used it to blame
"everything" on the Jews. Scapegoating is classic single-cause
thinking.) If, as I believe, it is the job of the professional journalist
not to find some sort of ultimate explanation for things but rather
to keep "improving the quality of the conversation about the
world" among our readers and audiences, then, I felt, it was impor-
tant to remind the audience that the fallacy of resorting to single-
cause thinking was just as possible among Iraqis as among Ameri-
cans, and just as likely to settle on a conclusion unattractive to the
opponent.
Americans were, of course, no less involved in an intellectual
melee over what the Gulf War was really about. Was it about Sad-
dam's invasion of Kuwait? Or WAS it about oil? Or was it really
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about Saddam's nuclear weapons?
Things never happen for any one reason, but because of many
things happening in the same place at the same time. Yet we still
have a primitive reflex to blame one thing. Foreign countries, other
than Iraq, have invaded foreign countries, other than Kuwait,
without America going to war over it. But they have not invaded
vital oil supplies while led by a dictator whose disregard for human
rights oppresses his own people and Kurds and Shiites and Israelis,
and whose army is backed and advised by the Soviet military es-
tablishment, which at the same time (we now know) was also plan-
ning a coup against Gorbachev's new open government in Moscow.
All these factors, and several more, spurred the Coalition
against Saddam in war-not one of them, but the threatening com-
bination. But that is still not all; Saddam Hussein chose to go to
war, too. He and many natives of his region considered the Gulf
War to be, among other things, the latest battle in an eighty-year-
long war against domination by oil dependent foreigners. First
there had been the British, then the Americans, and now all major
oil-dependent countries. Many Iraqis argued: suppose China tried
to dominate Pennsylvania and New York because of some mineral
needed in China? What then would the people of that region do?
We found that many Iraqis both despised Saddam's human
rights record and considered him right when he said he fought for
regional dignity, and also right when he said he won a kind of
moral victory in holding out against so many foreigners. So Iraq's
regional dignity was also one of the things this war was really
about. It's not either-or; it's and-and-and.
Philosopher David Hume said that it is when we get lazy that
we start looking for causes1.5 I have come to feel now more than
ever that one good, simple definition of the journalist's job is that
it tries to help the audience see the complexity of causes in a clear
and simple way. This is the really tough part of being a good jour-
nalist, and is often overlooked because not only the public but edi-
tors and journalists themselves are so eager for understanding that
they often settle for what merely sounds simple.
3. Our "Breakthrough" Spot
On the weekend when the ground war began, we aired a spot
5' See generally DAVID HUME, HUME ON HUMAN NATURE AND THE UNDERSTANDING
(1962).
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about Muslim women coming into a Christian churchyard during a
Sunday service to pray there to the Virgin Mary for an end to the
war and the safe return of their men at the front. This spot was,
we believed, a journalistic breakthrough. We felt this belief was
confirmed when, the next day, the contents of the spot were being
reported and retold both by American international propaganda,
including the Voice of America radio broadcasts into Iraq in
Arabic, and by the Iraqi propaganda officials, including the Direc-
tor of Foreign Journalist Procedures, who praised it widely and re-
quested a special re-screening of it in the Al-Rasheed Hotel.
We could only speculate about why either side wanted to pro-
mote this spot. Our interest in its story included the belief that it
contained interesting cross-cultural information,' breaking down
false stereotypes about Muslim-Christian relations, and that it also
conveyed (and helped audience members realize) universal feelings
about this war, and every war, which were being felt with especial
acuteness by people on all sides as the ground war got underway.2
A fact I felt it necessary to repeat in several spots as the war
wound to a close was the obvious acceptance by many Iraqis of an
idea Saddam Hussein had been promoting from the beginning of
the war-that every day Iraq, one country, held out against the
twenty-eight countries arrayed against it, was a day of moral vic-
tory. However unpleasant it may have been for Americans to think
about this Iraqi belief, I felt it was significant. Reports from Bagh-
dad more than eighteen months later only confirm this. Recent re-
ports suggest this belief is still held by a significant number of
Iraqis and other Arabs, and would seem to be a salient factor in
the political dynamics that have helped Saddam Hussein retain
power.
The day after the war-and the bombing-ended, I found a
few people in a couple of neighborhoods who showed signs of being
ready to say on camera that they did not approve of Saddam Hus-
sein. I thought, perhaps, the psychological bonding effect of aerial
bombardment was already wearing off. However, I was rotated out
of Baghdad the next day on a long-delayed visa exchange, and I
left that part of the story for our incoming correspondent.
", A year after the war's end, each of the four members of our ABC newsteam still
receive unsolicited comments from people about this spot. For some reason it remained in
the memory of viewers, so perhaps it managed to report and say something about the war
that otherwise went unreported and unsaid.
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4. A Glimpse at the Team-Game Dynamics Generating Our TV
News from Baghdad
It is not necessarily the case that good TV news spots are gen-
erated by more than one journalist at the scene, but, at least in the
current, early stage of TV news technology, it usually is a "news
team" that produces TV news spots. Any judgments about the
generation of TV news from Baghdad may require information
about the group dynamics that helped produce it.
There is no one right way to compose a TV news team. Such
teams differ in makeup and division of labor from story to story
and according to the widely varying inclinations and skills of the
people involved. There has been during the 1970's and 1980's only
a rough agreement, for example, about what the word "producer"
means in TV news reporting from foreign stories; I believe the
most serviceable description establishes that it is the producer's
job to make sure that the best possible product gets delivered on
time, and recognizes that this sometimes means the producer does
almost nothing but watch and check, and sometimes means that
the producer might have to do anything from playing psychiatrist
to a team member to organizing foreign satellite TV stations to
shooting videotape to writing scripts-virtually anything short of
getting in front of the camera or laying down a voice track; when a
producer in an emergency also has to do that, then, he also be-
comes the correspondent.
Generally speaking, when a TV news team works well to-
gether, it is often hard to distinguish any given aspect of the report
as being the contribution of any one member of the team; the con-
stant back-and-forth exchange of ideas generates the spot. Rupen
Vosgimorukian, the cameraman with whom I had covered a num-
ber of other Middle East wars, speaks eight languages fluently, in-
cluding languages relevant to this conflict. He is widely known for
his skill in adapting a wide range of film techniques to the ends of
principled journalism. Whenever we came in from taping in and
around Baghdad, Rupen sat at tape editor Vladimir Lozinski's
shoulder throughout the screening and editing process to help
make sure the best and the right shots were identified and quickly
found.
Vladimir Lozinski, the videotape editor and chief engineer
who, like Rupen, has worked with ABC News for years, indulged in
what I can only call astonishing "editorial wiring"-and with great
discretion. He often spent twenty-hour days rewiring the editing
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and feed-room lash-ups, inventing new ways for us-not only ABC
News but most of the other journalists in the Al-Rasheed Ho-
tel-to get news out. For example, he devised schemes for wiring
between rooms and floors that allowed the necessary Iraqi mili-
tary-clearance monitoring while at the same time giving us greater
privacy, freedom, and schedule flexibility in the editing of our
spots and in our editorial coordination with New York through
pre-feed satellite-phone conversations.
Especially notable was the wiring he quietly planned in the
hours before the ground war began. It enabled us to send live pic-
tures of bombs dropping over Baghdad as the deadline passed,
even as I was talking live to anchorman Peter Jennings in New
York about that bombing outside our window. Vladimir handled
the surprised objections of the Iraqi military clearance "listener"
by simply turning down my live audio for thirty seconds while he
convinced the "listener" that it was all a good idea, and then turn-
ing my audio back up. All this was aside from Vladimir's lightning-
speed tape editing-always executed with solid editorial sensibil-
ity-in the midst of fragile power supplies, failing wire connec-
tions, impossible multi-nation satellite feed schedules, and loud
bombardments.
Bill Thomas, our producer, applied constant diplomatic main-
tenance to our ever-evolving operating procedures with the Iraqi
Ministry of Information people in the hotel. They were themselves
nervous that they might get in trouble with their superiors, given
all the energetic western-style news reporting we were pushing to
get out at every opportunity. The human lines of communication
he kept open were critical to constant reassurance, on both sides,
that principles and ground rules, such as they were, were not being
violated. In a general setting of growing anxieties, no electricity,
and little running water, Bill's constant efforts and professional
personal intervention provided a working environment which re-
mained vibrant and miraculously free of distraction-a necessary
condition for the quality of work we pursued.
On the not-infrequent days when it was impossible to get pre-
feed phone calls through to New York, I relied on an editing-room
assembly of this four-man team to give my script the only once-
over it would get, and which every script needs. On such days, una-
ble to learn what length of spot my New York editor-producers
would want for their strictly timed 28-minutes-and-26-seconds eve-
ning news show, nor able to learn whether they were running a
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"special" one-hour show, nor which aspects of my day's offering
might interest them least, I usually transmitted a cut spot which
was 30 to 60 seconds longer than I suspected they would want,
hoping to give them some options; on such days I tried always to
structure the spot in such a way that, after they might have lifted
any parts before airing, the spot would not accidentally misrepre-
sent what we were trying to report from Baghdad. This was always
a challenge to the intuition, but some months later, after reviewing
my spots as aired, I found the short video-and-track edits that had
been made in New York had in no way altered any sense I had
meant to convey nor left out anything I thought critical.
The other three members of our four-man team also contrib-
uted unsuspected culinary skills on the hot plate which ran off the
video-editing machines' power supply-a source which meant it
was unusable during spot-cutting. Our daily schedule ended with a
fast meal around midnight, cooked on the hot plate-just after
tape editing ended and just before the Iraqis shut off all generators
and thus all transmissions and phone calls. We rose at dawn, often
underslept due to loud nighttime bombardments which we often
captured on videotape from our windows. Most mornings, camera-
man Vosgimorukian and I explored Baghdad neighborhoods, re-
turning in the late morning to cut one or two spots for morning
news shows and which we would feed around noon on the same
transmissions on which I did live "Q&A" with morning news
anchors. We would then return to our Baghdad explorations in the
afternoon, and return to the hotel at dark for more spot-cutting
and live Q&A for the evening news shows.
C. After Baghdad: A Hopeful Anecdote for the Future
Three weeks after the war ended, I had lunch in New York
with Marcello Zanini, an Italian journalist based in Latin America,
who had been WTN's producer-coordinator in Baghdad during the
war and whose job included coordinating the feed-time schedules
of the many news organizations from around the world who were
using our ABC News satellite dish. During this lunch, Marcello re-
marked that in the future it would be good if the world's nations
could just "let all us journalists" into wars with the same kind of
immunity "they give the International Red Cross." "We're a pro-
fession," he argued, saying that it is our job to try to show the
whole truth, and that everybody should want that. I have doubts
whether our profession is fully ready-with the full professional
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self awareness necessary-to win such international acceptance
yet. But I believe it will be, and should be.
In any case, our news team in Baghdad tried to provide TV
news coverage that would be seen by any thoughtful viewer as be-
ing neither pro-Coalition nor pro-Iraqi, but something better-a
service provided by professional skeptics which gave added per-
spective about the conflict to anyone interested.
III. SoME NEW CONCLUSIONS
As stated in the introduction, the Gulf War was the first in
history in which a large population expected to get routine, public,
daily reports from an enemy capital under fire and this seems inev-
itably to have put a new kind of focus on the principles of profes-
sional journalism-at least for some people. The following are
some of the principles and realizations which had been developing
in my mind over my previous twenty years as a journalist-years
that included covering eight "wars" or sizable conflicts-and which
I was prompted to crystalize especially because of reflections about
professional journalism during and after the Gulf War.
A. The Proper Hierarchy of Professional Allegiance
Pioneer television journalist Fred Friendly is said, among jour-
nalists, to have stated that our profession is one in which one must
"come to work every day perfectly ready to be fired-for the right
reasons.""3 My news organization understands that my allegiance
to them takes second place to my allegiance to my profes-
sion-that I work for them in my capacity as a self-proclaimed
member of a universal profession. This, however, does not settle
the often confused questions asking how patriotism and journalis-
tic professionalism can coexist.
Accordingly, and especially in light of the classical skepticism
asserted and renewed by Professors Hallie and Warnock,54 I would
suggest that the proper, basic hierarchy of allegiances for the pro-
fessional journalist is as follows:
The first allegiance is to "flesh and blood"--This means fam-
13 "I said it to Murrow in 'fifty-five when we went to Suez and I have said it a dozen
times since." Telephone Conversation with Fred Friendly (Dec. 7, 1992). See generally FRED
FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS.
FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING (1979).
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ily, friends, community, nation, all fellow humans, and, finally, the
planet-their needs, natures, and laws, according to whatever prin-
ciples of allegiance to the world's "flesh and blood" you openly
state to be yours.55
The second allegiance is to profession-to the promise you
make to the world about the kind of professional activity which it
may count upon you trying to provide.5
The third allegiance is to employer-to fulfill contractual ob-
ligations. In the case of the professional journalist, this must in-
clude the understanding that the employer understands that the
principles of profession must precede the interests of the company.
When the professional journalist is unable to reconcile differences
on this point, the option of quitting, or being fired, may have to be
considered.
In other words, you obviously have to be a trustworthy person
of some kind before you can make a convincing professional prom-
ise, and you must be a trustworthy professional before any reputa-
ble journalistic organization can hire and promote you as
such-journalism is an international profession, a universal activ-
ity, just as are medicine and gymnastics and entomology.5 7
The problem is not with the occasional dramatic case violating
this natural hierarchy of allegiance-a film crew that first films a
disturbed man dousing and setting himself afire and then moves to
help him. The allegiances in such dramatic cases are obviously
wrong, the natural primacy of flesh and blood obviously violated.
The endemic problem is in the journalist and/or employer who act
to support non-journalistic employment interests such as commer-
cial or personal promotion, at the expense of journalistic principle,
and do so in a way which may be unnoticeable to the public and
which may abuse the journalist's privileged position of potential
"I This way of using the phrase "flesh and blood" to refer to persons individually and in
groups, comes from Professor Hallie who develops it in various recent articles and speeches.
See Hallie, supra note 40, at 21. Hallie often cites Montaigne's essay Of the Art of Discus-
sion, where Montaigne says that "[iun the end we are always dealing with the individual
person, whose condition is astonishingly, marvelously, physical [and] corporeal." Michel de
Montaigne, Of the Art of Discussion, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 710 (Donald
M. Frame trans., 1958).
" See supra pt. I(C).
' To complete the reasoning here, in this age of objectivistic journalism, we can be
hired to do a generally understood sort of activity, and that activity is generally understood
to be antithetical, at least in its professional promise, to the activity of propagandists. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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influence and informational authority.
At least as problematic are journalists who may violate their
own natural allegiances to "flesh and blood" in the mistaken or
distracted belief that professional activity somehow takes prece-
dence over them, and do so in a way which does not attract the
attention of employer or public. Such betrayals of self are of course
a constant danger to any person's integrity. In journalism they oc-
cur not only when, say, a reporter in wartime slips all too easily out
of profession and into propaganda by reporting about an "enemy"
group or individual in a way which demonizes and thus helps fan
the flames of hatred, but also in peacetime whenever a reporter
allows himself or herself to take a cheap shot at some public per-
sonality and thus tempts the pathological tendency in any human
listener to feel proud by simply identifying negative qualities in
others.
B. Realization After Baghdad: Adolph Hitler Got His Genocide,
and Other Wishes, Because He Got His War
Somewhere in the course of covering foreign wars in the 1970's
I came to realize that war is in many ways the most boring story of
all. It is grindingly predictable and depressing: many people will
die, many more will endure unspeakable suffering, and there will
be much loss of valuable resources; while the war is raging, larger
numbers of people than usual will be incapable of reasonable con-
versation, prompted instead by the exigencies of violence to vaunt
themselves and betray the language and its beautiful and long-de-
veloped logics; then the war will end, as they all do, and people will
discover that the suffering was even greater than the smoke of war
had allowed them to see; afterwards, people will wring their hands
and ask whether it all really had to happen.
Unlike good science stories, for example, which have the clear
power to enlighten and give hope, war stories sooner or later pro-
duce revulsion and the desire to get on to something more bracing
to everyday living, 8 more positive, tolerable, genuinely engaging.
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, not unexpect-
edly, we had the same experience: the revelation of more suffering
than we had realized during the war, and then of even more suffer-
ing generated by the repercussions of the war. In the weeks follow-
ing the war, the world watched Kurdish families by the tens of
58 Hallie, supra note 40, at 60.
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thousands fleeing onto freezing mountains where many died,59 and
southern Shiites and Baghdad Sunnis slaughtering each other in
battles for control of southern Iraq. The horrifying estimates of the
number of Iraqi war dead-ranging from 50,000 to 350,000-was
compounded by the inability of any authority to produce even an
approximate number, thus adding to the dehumanizing aura of
these reports.6 0 The horror did not stop there. More than a year
after the general cease-fire, reports emerged of a genocidal cam-
paign against Kurdish villages which had been carried out by Sad-
dam's regime in the years prior to the Gulf War. This campaign
took place during a period of the Iran-Iraq War when, as was also
revealed, America and other Coalition countries had been arming
Iraq (and sometimes also arming Iran), apparently with at least
some awareness on the part of their intelligence services of the
genocidal human rights violations of the Saddam regime. This rev-
elation of pre-war atrocity might, for some, have seemed to justify
the Gulf War. Even for those for whom it did, however, there was
still the specter of all the additional suffering that the Gulf War
generated.
While contemplating, in the weeks following the war, how un-
surprising, almost routine, these immediate post-war revelations of
human suffering were, I finally realized a major flaw in the way we
have depicted World War II to ourselves in the West. (Why it had
taken me eight wars to finally see something so basic, I do not
know, but this must have something to do with the inevitable need
to justify any violence the benefits of which you do not want to
lose.)
Adolph Hitler was able to carry out the genocide he and his
associates wanted (to make Europe Judenrein-"cleansed of Jews"
and of others he considered inferior, such as Gypsies, or dangerous,
such as some Catholic clergy) because he got his war. That war also
achieved for him the same sort of self-dramatizing suicidal ending
in which he so reveled in his beloved Wagner Ring op-
eras-destruction of the gods by the forces of evil (Giitterdtimmer-
'" See Nicholas Pythian, Kurds Flee to Mountains in Face of Saddam Army On-
slaught, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 1991, PM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Reuter file (3
million Kurds fled); Michael Evans, Kurdish Death Toll 3,000, THE TImES, June 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Times file.
0 See generally ALAN F. GEYER & BARBARA GREEN, LINES IN THE SAND: JUSTICE AND THE
GULF WAR (1992).
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ung) and suicidal ending of the self-vaunting protagonists.6 1 The
Berlin bunker may not be where Hitler said he wanted to end up,
but one can at least play with the notion that there may have been
something unconsciously self-fulfilling in Hitler's luridly self-de-
structive, even operatic, career-a career in which he had many
more fellow travellers than it is possible even now for many to ac-
knowledge. The question of the profession of journalism is inti-
mately involved in this human tragedy. It behooves any profes-
sional journalist to discover and be able to explain why Gbbels
was not a professional journalist.
The smoke and chaos of war was critical to the execution of
the Nazi's complex and extensive plans for their death camps. A
definitive, authoritative book describing in detail the execution of
these plans makes this clear. Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of
the European Jews details, with extensive documentation, the con-
struction of the "killing centers" (the death camps), the intricate
planning of SS movements, and the complex coordination of
round-ups and arrests with schedules of train movements and
other means of removal, and these with the capacity-flow variables
of the various concentration camps.2
In the book's ninth chapter, entitled "Killing Center Opera-
tions," and especially in a section entitled "Concealment, ' 63 Hil-
berg explains how the top Nazi planners knew they had to keep
their own officers sometimes unaware of what each other was do-
ing-so any one saw only a small part of the final atrocity-a pre-
caution needed even within the anti-Semitic fever Nazi propa-
ganda had fed for fifteen years and even within the cover and
chaos of war. Without the smoky cover, international confusion,
and decimated communications systems of World War II, the Na-
zis would not have had the relative secrecy needed for their enor-
mous crime. 4
61 ERNEST NEWMAN, THE WAGNER OPERAS 591-634 (1963). The Ring Epic ends when the
main character, Wetan, refusing to relinquish the rings, commits suicide knowing that the
gods will perish along with him. Id.
62 See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1985).
63 Id. at 238.
6Id.
[S]ecrecy was a continuous problem .... At no point could any disclosure be
permitted .... When Viktor Brack of the F0ihrer Chancellery wrote to Himmler
about the necessity of speeding up the construction of the General government
camps, he pointed out: "You yourself, Reichsfilhrer, said to me some time ago that
for reasons of concealment alone we have to work as quickly as possible." . ..
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Of course we must be forever thankful for World War II be-
cause, finally, it stopped Hitler. We must remain deeply thankful
to the fighters who risked, and often lost, their lives stopping the
monstrosity. But we must also despise World War II, because it
allowed Hitler to murder six million Jews, and many others, and
bring devastation and human suffering on a previously unknown
scale. Without the heavy cover of war, Hitler could not have car-
ried out his Holocaust.
War's unpredictable restrictions give cover, and room, to evil.
If you let it come to war you give atrocity a head start. One lesson
of World War II must surely be that you do not wait until Hitler
invades Czechoslovakia to try to stop him; you try to stop him as
soon as he gets elected or otherwise takes power, as soon as his
plans for human rights offenses are known and seem to have any
chance of being realized. Early attempts to stop such individuals
and movements are likely to be possible without anything like the
violence and loss of life certain in war. And human rights viola-
tions are surely justifiable grounds for interfering in any country.
World War II is powerful, tragic evidence that doing so would have
been an act of defense.
Pope John Paul II, who as a young seminarian in Poland hid
from the Nazis who had him on a "wanted" list, has made speeches
during his international travels in which he stated simply: "When
Human Rights are violated, that's when wars begin." 5 And, in a
sense, one might say that hatred craves war so that it can be really
free.
If there had been a more energetic objectivistic professional
journalism in the 1930s,e6 and a journalism that declared as one of
its observation biases the belief of Professors Hallie and Warnock
that the wrongness of such things as human suffering are beyond
debate,6 7 then, it is reasonable to conjecture, the Nazi nightmare
might not have occurred.
No less prominent a journalist than Walter Cronkite stated
Another concealment message was verbal camouflage. The most important and
possibly the most misleading term used for the killing centers collectively was the
"East." This phrase was employed again and again during the deportations."
Id.
65 Noted by author during speech by Pope John Paul II, while author was Rome Bu-
reau Chief for ABC News (1978-84).
"0 Schudson teaches us, though, that objectivistic journalism was barely being born at
the time. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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publicly in the months following the Gulf War that if professional
journalists had been doing their jobs better in the year before the
war, it might not even have had to happen."' But no one, so far as
I know, has cared to probe, publicly at least, what he had in mind.
The reasons for the Bush administration's decisions regarding
when and how to fight the Gulf War were complex-though it is
now clear that it had much to do with cutting back to size a grow-
ing military power that the Coalition countries themselves had
built up through profitable arms sales and balance-of-power for-
eign policies utilized during the Iran-Iraq War. Even so, Cronkite's
conjecture stands: there might have been less atrocious ways than
war to build security for all if there had been a better informed
public opinion in the world.
In any case, I have found that the notion that, in a tragic
sense, Hitler won (or at least got many of his evil wishes fulfilled)
is not in the least questionable to some of the people who fought in
or otherwise survived World War II. They have responded to this
notion with such phrases as, "Well of course! That was the lesson if
anything was!" These are people who have direct, personal memo-
ries of World War II's horrible losses.
The recent tendency among some to think nostalgically of
World War II as "The Last Good War," and even to extol it, seems
to have obscured this greater and more tragic lesson. At least for
younger people-those who did not suffer from World War II but
only benefitted from it-there is no way to know what personal
and cultural riches might now exist on earth had the evils of
Hitler's racism not been tolerated for six years by partly racist and
anti-Semitic governments in Britain and America and been some-
how stopped in a less destructive manner.
This post-Gulf War realization brought with it, of course, an
ironic reappraisal of President Bush's labelling of Saddam as "a
Hitler." For President Bush, when he wanted to generate emo-
tional support for the war in America, finally so to label Saddam,
was for him to use the same demonizing techniques which Hitler
himself had used. There is no question that Saddam Hussein has
long been a human rights criminal on an appallingly large scale of
evil; in fact, he was so even well before American and other West-
ern governments stopped supporting and encouraging him. But
68 Walter Cronkite, The Media and the [Gulf] War: A Retrospective, Remarks at the
National Press Club in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 19, 1991).
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scapegoating ethnic groups, and the ancient demonizing propa-
ganda techniques of leaders trying to enflame a population for war,
are but two variations on the old and evil theme of getting people
to believe, at least for the moment, that there is ever such a thing
as a single cause for anything-"it's all their fault" or "it's all his
fault."
C. Realization After Baghdad: The Notion of a "Just War" is
Not Necessary for Anyone, Including the Military-and
Some Good News for the Planet
Elsewhere in this law review symposium it is reported that the
Vatican appears recently to be propagating the view that the well
known Catholic "Just War Theory," which goes back at least to
Thomas Aquinas, is not, and never has been, Catholic doctrine.69
I am not surprised. In the wake of the Gulf War it seemed to
me that there was at least one obvious piece of good
news-humankind in general seems finally to be developing a
greater intolerance for war-not total intolerance, of course, but
greater. This seemed to me evident in the apparent presumption
by leaders on both sides that world opinion would not put up with
a protracted war.
President Bush, who promised a quick war, took pains to de-
liver on that promise. It also seemed important for the United
States to obtain United Nations' support for the war in order to
gain, or at least appear to gain, a kind of legitimacy for their action
within the world community.
Moreover, both sides were almost completely successful in
their attempts to block journalists from witnessing the enormous
human suffering that this, as any major military conflict, gener-
ated. American officers told journalists they would block any pic-
tures that showed their soldiers hurt or dead. Iraqi officials han-
dling the foreign press kept journalists away from all pictures of
human suffering among the military.
It seemed that neither side wanted the world to be reminded,
or to learn again, of the abomination and insult to The Creation
that war always is. And the leaders of both sides are very guilty of
this betrayal of the inevitable and natural public trust with which
the Creator endows all forms of human government.
6" See Gordon C. Zahn, Ethics, Morality, and the Gulf War, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 777,
780-82 (1992).
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On one occasion when the human suffering of war did break
uncontrollably to the surface-the civilian disaster of the Amariya
shelter bombing 0-the Coalition "spin control" was instant and
massive, seeking both to acknowledge that the bombing was a
great misfortune while at the same time seeking to divert attention
from culpability by offering several, non-substantial "reasons" for
having made this mistake, such as camouflage on the roof, which
proved nothing, and to counter any mistaken impressions that the
disaster would lessen Coalition forces resolve to keep fighting. In
any case, this massive spin control indicated an enormous sensitiv-
ity in Washington, D.C. to how public opinion might react to this
first gruesome emergence of war's inevitable large-scale atrocity.
Noting that some of the greatest generals-such as the oft-
quoted Sun Tsu 71-have opined that the most successful army
never has to fight, or that, in a basic sense, there need only be
defense (indeed, governments around the world call their military
"defense" departments, not "offense" departments), and consider-
ing that the justification for World War II had so dangerously ob-
scured the even more important lesson that, without his war Hitler
could not have executed his Holocaust, it occurred to me in the
months following the Gulf War that there is no real reason for any-
body-including the military-to try to justify any war. Rather,
and at the very least, war can usefully be considered by any profes-
sion to be a failure-as great generals ever since Sun Tsu have said
it is.72 War's inevitable suffering is virtually axiomatic, as is its un-
desirability to all except the criminally aggressive or criminally
self-interested.
Is it not enough for the military institutions to recognize that,
until much better means of conflict resolution obtain on this
planet, the disaster of war will emerge from time to time as the
only apparent means for establishing security and, when it does,
atrocious as it always is, it must be brought swiftly to an end in a
way that encourages future security? As the science of Conflict
Resolution and Analysis develops and becomes better known, the
greatest of military leaders, who have more to lose in violent con-
flict than anyone, will likely be among the most progressive in es-
tablishing the always complicated structures of peace. In the
70 See supra pt. II.B.1.
71 See Sun Tsu, The Art of War, in ROOTS OF STRATEGY: A COLLECTION OF MILITARY
CLASSICS 66 (Thomas R. Phillips ed., 1982).
72 Id.
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meantime, I cannot see any advantage for any profession, including
the military, in trying to describe what a "just war" might be. Cer-
tainly, for example, it is unthinkable to me that anyone would de-
scribe World War II as a "just war"-given that it made Hitler's
Holocaust possible.
D. Three Tellingly Unexplored Questions About, and for, Jour-
nalists and the Military in the Gulf War
Question One: Why did Saddam Hussein choose to go to war?
If Western mass media journalists were genuinely motivated to
give their audiences perspective on this conflict, they would have
explored this question, but they did not. Perhaps they were afraid
it would have a pro-Saddam propagandistic effect on the audience;
if so, then it suggests that these journalists felt insecure about
their own abilities to generate coverage that was not propaganda of
some kind. It seems reasonable to presume that some journalists
did not explore this question because they had themselves been
successfully "propagandized" by the government into presuming
that Saddam was merely some kind of inhuman monster incapable
of reasoned, or partly legitimate, action-a belief, as events have
since made obvious, which would have been fatal to hold and in
any case quite incorrect.
Question Two: Why did Saddam Hussein set Kuwait's oil
wells on fire? This question received virtually no examination in
the mass media. Answers to it might well have embarrassed the
American government in the depiction of the Gulf War that it was
seeking to project to the American public in the months immedi-
ately following the Gulf War. The assumption made by many
Americans seems to have been simply that the firing of the oil
wells was the mindless act of a madman, of the "Hitler" President
Bush had said Saddam was. Though Saddam Hussein has indeed
long been a human rights criminal on an enormous scale, and one
whose record ought to have brought the censure of America and
the world years before it finally did in 1990, it is also possible that
firing the wells was a carefully considered and successful tactic.
Professional Middle East watchers I have talked with over the past
year consider two motives likely. First, the smoke from those fires
may have given Saddam cover for a successful military withdrawal
back to Baghdad just before Coalition forces rolled into Kuwait
City. Second, many saw it as an act of defiance that said to the
West and Japan, "This is our region. We can even set it on fire if
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we want."
Question Three: Did the frequent, sometimes daily, reporting
during the war of polls that said the public approval rating for the
war was extremely high-in the 80 or 90 percents-significantly
weaken the resolve of editors to avoid any reporting that seemed
motivated by an inclination to pander to the public's apparent be-
lief that the Gulf War was a good thing-reporting that was, essen-
tially, spirit-building propaganda as opposed to reporting that
sought always to add perspective and understanding? If and when
American editors begin publicly to explore this question, then it
may be possible to say that a serious examination by our profes-
sion or our performance in the Gulf War has finally begun.
I do not want to be mistaken here as self-righteous. A large
amount of human suffering occurred in Iraq. And as soon as the
war ended, making it more likely for journalists to document some
of that suffering, I did not fight to stay, but accepted my visa-swap
and returned home. That enormous suffering remains today un-
documented, with rare exceptions such as the work of Patrick
Sloyan. 3
E. Before Baghdad: A Challenging Psychiatric Anecdote for the
Present
On the third day of the Gulf War, which I had been watching
mostly in the central control room of ABC News, my editors asked
me to prepare a piece for the weekend news that would talk about
the feelings of confusion about the war which many Americans
were experiencing as it got under way. To get started, I inter-
viewed a psychologist, Kenneth Greenspan, M.D., of Manhattan,
who was working on a study which explained that every human has
always to deal, all at once, with the sometimes conflicting emotions
and demands of what can be thought of as the three different
brains which make up the human brain. He suggested that the
confused feelings of many Americans could be at least partly ex-
plained by this way of understanding the brain.
The oldest and simplest of the three, he said, is the brain stem
at the top of your spinal column-sometimes nicknamed the croco-
dile brain. It deals in basics: get, eat, kill, shove, slash, run ... It
specializes in mere survival. I asked why the floor of the stock ex-
change had, at the opening bell, burst into cheers the morning af-
71 See Sloyan, supra note 5, at 649-54.
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ter the Gulf War started. Doctor Greenspan replied that the same
things that make for success in mortal combat make for success on
the stock exchange: get, eat, kill. It was all the brain stem talking,
so to speak.
He said that the "second brain"-usually called the "mid-
brain"-evolved later. It contains many pleasure centers and likes
warm group happiness-feels love and comfort in group efforts.
The "mid-brain," for example, would want to feel good about our
soldiers, especially after American soldiers were treated unfairly
when returning from the Vietnam war.
He said the "third brain"-most recently evolved-is the
outer brain, the convoluted cerebral cortex. It meditates about
things, has imagination, can imagine the pain of others, asks ques-
tions. This third brain asks awkward questions even about the feel-
ings of the other two: if we kill, might it lead to more war? What
will a defeated enemy's neighbors think?
Finally, he said, you-the central self-are always listening to
all three of these brains. To function well, he said, you have to
keep all three brains in balance, keep them at least talking to each
other, which in the inflated emotions of wartime may be especially
hard. It would seem that it is especially hard in wartime to keep
that outer war from getting inside your cranium, and to keep your
inner war from getting out.
The next day I was called to duty, to report the Gulf War
from where it was happening, and so never finished that report
about Americans' mixed feelings about war. I was partly disap-
pointed, from a professional point of view. Having covered enough
wars already to know how essentially boring they are, I was in-
trigued to know what it might be like to watch and report on the
reactions of the American people throughout the course of the Gulf
War. Surely, there should be much more reporting to our mass au-
dience about the efforts of government to control public opin-
ion-often through reporting (including ours) to the mass audi-
ence. Those efforts, as any energetic journalist can document, are
prodigious. It seems manifestly obvious to me that not to report on
them is to weaken our professional claim to the audience; if the
audience's opinion is being manipulated by the government, should
that not be among the first things the public in a democratic coun-
try needs to know? So I regret that I did not have a chance to open
up this line of journalistic inquiry with the audience-the exami-
nation of the possible causes of our own emotions during war.
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In any case, Dr. Greenspan's "three brains" explanation offers
at least a metaphor for the challenge facing the professional jour-
nalist in a world that, at last, is showing a few signs of a growing
intolerance for violent conflict-however unsuccessful the world is
yet in learning how to prevent it.
How can we keep the "three brains"-in the cranium and, so
to speak, on the globe-at least talking to each other? Whatever
the answer, the young, international profession of modern objectiv-
istic journalism has-whether individual journalists realize it or
not-already promised the world that it will try to find out.

